The End of Bargaining in The Digital Age by Levmore, Saul & Fagan, Frank
Cornell Law Review
Volume 103
Issue 6 September 2018 Article 7
The End of Bargaining in The Digital Age
Saul Levmore
University of Chicago Law School
Frank Fagan
EDHEC Business School, France
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Saul Levmore and Frank Fagan, The End of Bargaining in The Digital Age, 103 Cornell L. Rev. 1469 ()
Available at: https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol103/iss6/7
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-6\CRN606.txt unknown Seq: 1 20-NOV-18 13:39
THE END OF BARGAINING IN
THE DIGITAL AGE
Saul Levmore & Frank Fagan†
Bargaining is a fundamental characteristic of many mar-
kets and legal disputes, but it can be a source of inefficiency.
Buyers often waste resources by searching for information
about past prices, where a seller already holds that informa-
tion.  A second—and novel—source of social loss is that some
buyers will avoid otherwise beneficial bargains and sellers
with negotiable prices because they recognize the seller’s ad-
vantage in any haggling match.  They might also hide informa-
tion that reveals their willingness to pay.  This Article argues
for mandated disclosure of past prices, and occasionally set-
tlements, where these have been negotiable.  The rule requires
uniform or transparent pricing, where uniformity means that
customers know that a price offered to them is the same as
that offered to others, and transparency refers to the disclo-
sure of past sale, or settlement, prices.  The rule is applied to
markets where consumers presently haggle with professional
sellers, including the sale of medical services to hospital pa-
tients, law school merit scholarships offered to prospective
students, and legal services sold to nonbusiness clients.  We
additionally explore its potential in employment relationships,
where it might be deployed to reduce male-female pay
disparities.
A requirement of uniform or transparent transactions can
limit a seller’s ability to price discriminate.  There are a few
markets in which price discrimination is desirable; for exam-
ple, in some cases that involve delivering important goods like
life-saving medicines or clean water.  We demonstrate how
those markets can be preserved alongside a requirement of
transparency.  Drawing on a variety of examples, including
familiar disclosure rules in contracts, as well as compulsory
licensing in copyright, and the utmost good faith doctrine in
insurance, we show that law is conceptually equipped to ad-
dress the social loss generated by duplicative search and
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at the University of Chicago Law School; Fagan is an Associate Professor of Law,
EDHEC Business School, France.  We are grateful for comments received from
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other inefficiencies, and we show that pricing disclosure rules
can be easily implemented, especially as markets increasingly
digitize.
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INTRODUCTION
Bargaining can be inefficient as well as costly, and it is
outdated.  Law can improve efficiency and lower costs by re-
ducing the bargaining power of professional, well-informed
parties.  Our claim is that there should be transparency in
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consumer transactions and that negotiable prices are often in-
consistent with transparency.  If consumers can bargain with a
seller, then they should be armed with knowledge of the prices
that emerged from recent, comparable transactions.  Just as it
is sensible for law to require truth-in-labeling, so that buyers
need not undertake expensive searches in order to know the
ingredients and caloric content of packaged food, or the energy
efficiency of an appliance or automobile, law might require dis-
closures about the prices of completed sales in order to save
the resources buyers would expend to discover information al-
ready known to a seller.1  For example, applicants admitted to
law schools duplicatively and wastefully search for information
about merit scholarships, as they try to strike deals for lower
net tuition; a typical law school admissions office has a formi-
dable bargaining advantage compared to these buyers, and this
advantage generates duplicative information-gathering rather
than efficient price discrimination.
But law schools, as professional sellers of services to con-
sumers, could reveal the net prices agreed upon with other
applicants, or matriculants, with specified admission creden-
tials.  The same is true for sellers of new cars and for hospitals
that treat patients.  The key to law reform in this area is to
reduce search costs by requiring or somehow encouraging dis-
closure—but not where this mandate would discourage inno-
vation or efficient price discrimination.
There is a second benefit to transparent pricing—which is
to say more law and less bargaining.  Uninformed, inexperi-
enced players are sometimes discouraged from participating in
markets because they recognize that professional hagglers will
get the better of the deal.  Transparent pricing can bring these
reticent participants to the market in a way that individual
sellers cannot.  These discouraged buyers, as we call them, are
a source of previously unrecognized inefficiency in many mar-
kets.  If they are disproportionately female, as some evidence
suggests, the problem and the inefficiency are especially com-
1 Economists recognize the waste in search costs by consumers, but no one
has come to grips with what this means for law. See generally S. Salop & J.E.
Stiglitz, The Theory of Sales: A Simple Model of Equilibrium Price Dispersion with
Identical Agents, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 1121 (1982); Peter A. Diamond, A Model of
Price Adjustment, 3 J. ECON. THEORY 156 (1971); Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and
Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 AM.  ECON.
REV. 561 (1971); George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON.
213 (1961); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Imperfect Information in the Product Market, in 1
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 771 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D.
Willig eds., 1989).
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pelling.  Finally, the more sellers can individualize the bargains
that they offer, the more buyers will work to hide information
from potential sellers.  This too is a cost that can be reduced by
requiring sellers to offer uniform prices.  Our proposal may
seem radical, but the discussion points to areas of law, ranging
from tender offers for securities to compulsory copyright li-
censes, where these insights about bargains, inefficient
searches, and price discrimination already seem reflected in
existing rules.
Part I introduces the problem of duplicative searching and
then that of discouraged buyers.  It describes the modern case
against bargaining where one side is ill-informed.  Part II shows
how law can improve upon the unfettered free market with a
dramatic transparency requirement that largely solves the
problems associated with negotiable prices.  Alternatively, sell-
ers can simply offer fixed, or uniform, pricing, so that on a
given day a customer knows she is facing the same prices as
other customers.  Part III considers the tension between a
transparency requirement and efficient price discrimination by
sellers.  The uniformity-or-transparency proposal is largely
limited to consumer transactions, and the discussion identifies
the characteristics of markets where the proposed rule ought
not apply either because it interferes with efficient price dis-
crimination or interferes with incentives for innovation.  Fi-
nally, the Conclusion considers the paths by which law and
technology might bring about transparent pricing in consumer
transactions.
I
WHAT’S WRONG WITH NEGOTIATION?
A. Introduction: Negotiable versus Uniform Prices
Information is available in many markets because sellers
provide it and, sometimes, because law requires it.  Many sell-
ers, including airlines, voluntarily help potential buyers com-
pare a single seller’s offerings; a buyer who is about to pay for a
seat on a flight can easily see how switching to a different flight,
or even a different seat on the same flight, will save money.  The
seller reduces buyers’ search costs by providing this informa-
tion, although the pricing strategy itself might be part of a price
discrimination scheme, as discussed in Part III.2  For the pre-
sent, it is useful to set price discrimination—good and bad—
aside.  Sellers are, in any event, less likely to help buyers com-
2 See infra subpart III.A.
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pare prices with those offered by competitors, and indeed in
some cases they will attempt to block information about com-
petitors’ prices.3  Internet shopping and platforms have, how-
ever, reduced transaction costs for buyers, who can more easily
gather information than could consumers of yesteryear.  In
some markets, intermediaries make a business of providing
information about multiple sellers, and saving buyers’ search
costs.  Sellers may facilitate this intermediary’s work, paying
for referrals or advertising on its platform, or they may resist,
usually by declining to make sales through the intermediary or
to pay it for referrals.4  At the same time, the Internet has also
decreased the costs to sellers of gathering information about
potential buyers, and it has decreased the cost of experi-
menting with various forms of price discrimination.  There is a
kind of software arms race between buyers and professional
sellers.5  Overall, as the cost of acquiring information has
dropped, buyers have been better able to learn about market
prices and quality, while sellers have learned more about indi-
vidual buyers and their willingness to pay.6
3 See, for example, Amazon’s recent plan to block comparisons done in-
store, where free-riding is especially problematic.  Consumers who search for
comparisons with retailer-provided Wi-Fi may be barred access.  U.S. Patent No.
9,665,881 (filed May 4, 2012) (issued May 30, 2017); see also Dani Deahl, Amazon
Granted a Patent that Prevents In-store Shoppers from Online Price Checking,
VERGE (June 15, 2017, 6:42 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/6/15/15812
986/amazon-patent-online-price-checking [https://perma.cc/4TGB-8NJ8].  Sell-
ers do at times offer comparisons when competitors’ prices are higher, but the
strategy is risky and thus not common.  First, the competitors’ prices might
change and the seller is open to accusations of deceptive advertising.  Second,
when price comparisons are not offered but expected, buyers may reason that
they are paying too high a price here at this, suddenly silent, seller.  A seller’s
promise to match prices is discussed below in section I.C.1.
4 Thus, Expedia enables buyers to compare airline prices and schedules; it
earns a commission from sales and profits from buying blocks of tickets at a
discount and reselling them at market prices.  Southwest Airlines, for one, does
not use Expedia as an agent and does not sell discount tickets to third parties like
Expedia, relying on its brand name and reputation for low prices.  Consumers
who search for flights on Expedia alone might miss better options on Southwest,
and vice versa.
5 In some situations, there is a professional buyer with many dispersed
sellers, but the problem is normally symmetrical and our examples will assume a
professional seller, rather than a professional buyer.  “Professional” can be taken
as synonymous with the party engaged in repeat play and better informed.
6 For instance, online sellers can collect information about the shopping
habits of specific users and respond with tailored coupons and discounts, or
simply offer differential pricing.  Because online markets are highly competitive, it
is unlikely, if not impossible, that these practices would violate the Robinson-
Patman Act. See Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S.
164, 181 (2006) (noting that the Robinson-Patman Act should be read “consist-
ently with broader policies of the antitrust laws” (quoting Brooke Group Ltd. V.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 220 (1993))). Still, many online
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In some cases, online shopping has also brought on more
“haggling,” or back and forth negotiation, though not exactly
the haggling of the flea market or suq.  Sellers can state high
initial prices in order to try to capture buyers who are impa-
tient or otherwise disinclined to search.7  They know that they
can lower prices in the future, or that some buyers will regard
the stated prices as invitations to bargain.  In both bricks-and-
mortar and online venues, some buyers will return to a site
repeatedly, or gather coupons, in anticipation of better deals.
In many cases, when a buyer haggles, it becomes less likely
that the buyer will go elsewhere, inasmuch as it is expensive for
the buyer to sink such costs and acquire information about
multiple sellers.  The tourist who gets out of her car to inquire,
or bargain, about a hotel room, has invested in an actual loca-
tion and must bear additional cost if she departs and continues
to search elsewhere.  This is a strategic problem rather than
one of duplicative costs but it, too, points to costs brought on
by haggling.  The same is true online when a buyer enters
personal information and thus invests in a visited site or seller.
Negotiation seems like a fundamental feature of markets,
but there are several reasons to regard a good deal of bargain-
ing activity as inefficient.  The first, and most significant, is
that buyers often engage in wasteful duplication of effort when
they gather information.  The second is that willing buyers
might decline to participate in the market, or bear extra costs
in investigating other sellers, because they perceive that they
are inferior hagglers, and at a disadvantage when up against a
professional seller.  A third is that if buyers perceive that sellers
will charge higher prices to buyers they know to be eager, buy-
ers will work to hide their information from sellers.  Profes-
sional sellers are aware of buyer impatience and search costs,
and they can also exploit informed hunches about buyers’ per-
ceptions.  In face-to-face dealings, buyers may accept offers in
order to avoid confrontation, or because they think that eti-
quette requires a sale once the seller has devoted his time.  An
retailers are reluctant to discuss their pricing practices for fear of negative public-
ity.  Adam Tanner, Different Customers, Different Prices, Thanks to Big Data,
FORBES (Mar. 26, 2014, 6:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/adamtanner/
2014/03/26/different-customers-different-prices-thanks-to-big-data/#626f3b0
65730 [https://perma.cc/YV9Z-T8BX].
7 To take the best-known example, Priceline.com is an intermediary that
offers hotels, flights, and rental cars.  Buyers can compare prices but, more inter-
estingly, they can submit bids and experiment with extremely low offers. An
accepted bid finalizes a contract, so a bid is a promise to buy at that price.  There
is a waiting period before another bid can be made, so that buyers cannot simply
start low and, at no cost, reduce bids step by step.
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experienced retailer might offer tea, but in the long run these
kinds of interactions and the expectations they produce can
reduce market participation as buyers avoid unwanted pres-
sure or unfavorable situations.  In turn, sellers do not want to
lose these buyers.  If they are willing to give up entirely on their
bargaining advantage, then they can promise uniform pric-
ing—by which we mean a practice that promises buyers that
they are obtaining the same price as other buyers of the same
good from the same seller.  Uniform pricing is essentially a
guarantee that there is no room or need to negotiate.  Where
there is uniform pricing, buyers have no need to hide personal
details, and no need to fear that their inferior haggling ability
will be costly.  Finally, they can often rely on the presence of a
few informed buyers to make prices competitive.  Transparency
regarding recent sales is a second-best solution to all these
problems.  Especially where goods are not perfectly identical, or
where market conditions change, so that uniform pricing is
impractical, the buyer might be as satisfied by transparency as
by uniformity.8
Note that the problems associated with haggling, primarily
duplicative search and discouraged buyers, go above and be-
yond any inequality or redistributive argument in favor of legal
intervention.  Even wealthy, privileged buyers suffer from the
problems identified here.
B. Duplicative Search Where Prices Are (Not Uniform but)
Negotiable
In many markets, prices are uniform and competition is
intense.  There is no retail bargaining, so when a seller changes
prices, they change for all customers at the same time.  When
filling an automobile tank with gasoline, for instance, there is
little information-gathering and no bargaining.  Even though
arbitrage is impractical, consumers can count on a small (but
sufficient) number of comparison shoppers to keep prices com-
petitive.9  Buyers who do search have an especially easy time
because online apps, including navigation programs, report
8 When sellers strategically create nonidentical goods and services in order
to charge buyers different prices, they engage in “third-degree” price discrimina-
tion. ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 404 (8th ed.
2013).
9 Even with imperfect information, a reasonably competitive market allows
buyers to benefit from the searching, or comparison shopping, undertaken by a
modest number of other shoppers. See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Interven-
ing in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analy-
sis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 649–51 (1979).
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gasoline prices at nearby stations.  A less energetic buyer,
whose habit it is to observe prices at the first gasoline pumps
encountered on a given day and then to patronize the next
station with better prices, will also do very well.10  In contrast,
unless one finds searching to be very expensive, it would be
unwise for the purchaser of an automobile to take the price
offered by the second dealer, even though the good is homoge-
neous and the discovered price is better than that posted at a
prior dealership.  Past price information is of little value where
there is uniformity, unless the buyer can defer the purchase
and has reason to think that past prices help predict future
ones, as they might with seasonal goods.  Consumers who need
gasoline might want to do some research about the prices of-
fered by other sellers, but inasmuch as all the customers at a
given gas station on a given day pay the same price, there is no
benefit to inquiring about past prices in order to choose among
sellers.
Where prices are not uniform, there is either price discrimi-
nation among buyers or, simply, room for negotiation.11  The
latter characterizes such businesses as automobile dealer-
ships, real estate developers, rug showrooms, and law school
admissions offices, where admitted students bargain for merit
scholarships.  In all four of these cases the buyer negotiates
better when she knows the price or prices at which the seller
has parted with goods.  If prices are uniform, so that everyone
pays the same price for a given model automobile, a square foot
of an apartment of certain quality, or a seat in an entering class
(given test scores and undergraduate grades of x and y), then
the buyer has little need to engage in extensive search.  The
10 See John J. McCall, The Economics of Information and Optimal Stopping
Rules, 38 J. BUS. 300, 316 (1965) (analyzing the optimal moment for terminating a
search when the decisionmaker can accumulate more information but where
opportunities, once passed on, cannot be revisited).
11 Sellers might announce nonuniform pricing such as different tuitions for
in-state and out-of-state residents.  As long as the product is the same for both
consumer types, announced nonuniform pricing constitutes transparent price
discrimination and reduces search costs.
Note that pricing remains “uniform” when customers face the same prices at
the same geographical point of sale.  For example, Whole Foods A may charge less
for a dozen roses than Whole Foods B.  The stores need not offer the same sales or
respond to different consumer elasticities in an identical manner.  The important
thing for search costs is that a consumer who enters the store knows that no one
has negotiated a better price there.  If Whole Foods charges different prices to
different customers at the same point of sale, then it is said to be engaging in price
discrimination.  Similarly, surge pricing during peak traffic times as seen in mar-
kets for utilities, Uber rides, and high- versus low-season vacation packages,
allows sellers to announce apparently nonuniform prices even though they are
engaging in price discrimination by proxy.
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buyer may still want to discover the prices charged by close
competitors, but in many cases a buyer can rely on the fact
that some other buyers are engaged in comparison shopping,
so that the buyer can rely on the market to drive the uniform
prices down, much as it does in gasoline stations.  A reasona-
ble buyer might search just a bit or not at all.
In the absence of uniform pricing, the rational buyer will
seek out more information about competitors’ prices or, what is
often easier, information about the sales prices agreed to by
other buyers who have dealt recently with the seller under
consideration.  One problem, or serious inefficiency, associated
with negotiable prices is, therefore, that buyers must find out
about other prices in order to negotiate, or know whether to
accept the first (or any subsequent) price offered to them.  Uni-
form pricing offers the protection of other buyers’ comparison
shopping efforts; in the absence of uniform pricing, it pays to
gather information.  Importantly, many buyers are after the
same information.  Unless there is a cheap method of discover-
ing what other buyers have learned, buyers will engage in du-
plicative and thus wasteful searches for price information.  The
duplication is inefficient because the seller (and eventually
other buyers) already holds this information and could share it.
The seller does not share it voluntarily because he hopes that
under-informed buyers will overpay.  The likely result is some
redistribution in favor of the seller—which is why the seller
chooses not to post prices that all customers will pay on a given
day—and some wasted resources associated with the duplica-
tive searches.  There may be cases where the buyer’s efforts will
increase utility, as where the buyer simply enjoys shopping or
learning about other goods when doing so, but in the over-
whelming majority of cases, we can be certain that the average
buyer prefers more information at lower cost, so long as the
information is, like prices, easy to process.12
There are a few markets in which law already demands
uniform pricing.  Where tender offers in corporate law are con-
cerned, the Williams Act insists on an equal-treatment rule for
dispersed investors (sellers of shares, in this case).13  The rule
solves a well-known collective action problem among share-
holders, to be sure, but it also economizes on search costs and
12 Put differently, buyers are heterogeneous and some may benefit just where
most suffer avoidable costs.  When a fundamental right or property interest is not
at stake, law normally and sensibly aims to reduce overall costs or to cater to the
majority.
13 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(d)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1988).
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ensures that individual sellers need not engage in separate
negotiations.14  Some legal systems require uniform pricing for
initial public offerings of stock, and this too reduces search
costs.15
Where negotiation is common at present, as in the case of a
real estate developer or automobile dealer with one hundred
units to sell, a requirement of uniform pricing, and thus an end
to negotiation, may seem disruptive, but it need not be.  As with
securities, the seller could start with a uniform high price and
then, if inventories required it, prices could be lowered for all
customers until the market cleared.  The dealer would become
more like the conventional department store, where there is no
value to bargaining prowess.  We do not suggest that law go so
far as to require an equal-treatment rule; under such a rule,
once the market cleared and the units were all sold, money
would be returned to buyers who paid anything above the mar-
ket-clearing price.  Buyers who were willing to pay something
more than the (eventual) market price would save search costs
and have no need to assess inventories or look for sales.16
Uniform pricing without an equal treatment rule provides more
reason for search but, compared to a market with negotiable
prices, it dramatically reduces search costs.
14 Id.  The Act has been criticized on grounds that this equal-treatment rule
unduly encourages shareholders to tender.  For this, and the idea that the Act can
be evaded but that small shareholders are unlikely to negotiate on their own, see
Richard A. Booth, The Problem with Federal Tender Offer Law, 77 CALIF. L. REV.
707 (1989).
15 Other jurisdictions allow auctions in which participants agree to pay what
they bid down to the market-clearing price.
16 This equal-treatment rule, or version of a descending-price auction, is
more appropriate where bidding and market clearing take place within a short
period of time.  In a typical department store, prices drop over time not only
because some buyers value the item more than others but also because an item
may be worth less late in the season or when similar products come to market.  It
is tempting to rush to the conclusion that uniform pricing is unworkable outside
of securities markets and retail stores, because things like used cars and condo-
miniums, for example, are not perfectly homogeneous—and sellers can certainly
differentiate them if it is profitable to do so.  But even in these markets, uniform
pricing with strategically differentiated products will decrease search costs.  As
discussed in the text, a uniformity-or-transparency rule works to reduce search
costs and other inefficiencies; where uniform pricing is unworkable or undesir-
able, transparent pricing can reduce the inefficiency associated with duplicative
information-gathering by buyers, so long as transparency is understood to in-
clude information about past, comparable transactions. In practice, the idea is for
most sellers to post prices, make use of discounts or inventory-clearing sales so
long as they are available to all, but then also disclose recently negotiated excep-
tions to these prices.
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C. Discouraged Buyers
1. Inefficiency When Buyers Avoid Haggling
Haggling is as old as the Bible,17 and it is a skill that most
commercial parties, politicians, and parents develop in order to
succeed in their respective roles.  It was a necessary skill when
households dealt repeatedly with a limited set of necessities,
and when many goods were not standardized.  In modern
times, it is a process that many amateurs seek to avoid, even if
it means forgoing bargains, because they recognize that a re-
luctant or inept participant is sure to pay too high a price in an
environment where opening prices are meant to leave room for
haggling.  Buyers who know they are disinclined or disadvan-
taged by haggling can look for other venues where they can
patronize competitive sellers with nonnegotiable prices.  In
some markets, it is the talented haggler who must leave the
mainstream to exercise her skill.  One does not haggle at a
typical supermarket, on a stock exchange, or at an Apple store.
Subpart I.B emphasized the duplicative search costs that
are experienced in a world without uniform pricing, and the
discussion now turns to a second problem inherent in negotia-
ble prices.  The problem, or inefficiency, derives from the fact
that the cost of haggling, especially for one who knows that she
is an inferior haggler, causes some buyers to spend resources
in quest of other commercial venues and, at times, simply
causes disinclined buyers to avoid markets.  An anti-haggler
may buy a new car less often than she would otherwise wish to;
she may go to CarMax to enjoy uniform pricing when there are
other used car dealers much closer to home;18 she may even
opt for rental housing in order to avoid the haggling associated
with buying or renovating a home.  It is not simply the distaste
for haggling that creates the inefficiencies, because this prefer-
ence might be offset by another person’s haggling pleasure.  It
is instead the increased costs associated with traveling further
and avoiding transactions.19  Thus, imagine a state in which all
17 Abraham haggles with God, bargaining down the number of righteous
people required to save Sodom from destruction.  He gains the rescue of Lot and
his family. Genesis 18:16-33 (Revised English Bible).  The word “haggle” (used
with respect to price) is at least four hundred years old. See Haggle, https://www
.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/haggle [https://perma.cc/8GNZ-KY33] (last
visited July 12, 2017).  It is plausible that ancient exchanges involved offers that
were accepted or not, but it is at least as likely that haggling prevailed long before
there were nonnegotiable asking prices.
18 CarMax, and its fixed pricing policy, is discussed infra section I.C.2.
19 Cf. Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, Transaction Costs and the Robustness
of the Coase Theorem, 116 ECON. J. 223, 223 (2006) (noting that parties who must
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price information comes with thirty-minute lags.  There might
be a few people who enjoy the suspense offered by the lag, but
for the most part, the information lag reduces market efficiency
and causes a drop in the number of mutually beneficial trans-
actions.  In this lagged environment, every transaction requires
time and effort that could be spent on other activities.  This is
the world as experienced by disinclined, unskilled hagglers.
It might seem that the inefficiency associated with these
discouraged buyers will be solved by self-interested sellers, ea-
ger to attract them.  But on closer inspection it becomes clear
that the haggling problem is caused, rather than solved, by
such sellers, because they happily sacrifice some transactions
with buyers who do not wish to haggle in return for the extra
profit available from haggling.  In terms of economic efficiency,
the critical factor is that haggling transfers wealth between a
seller and his buyers, while each discouraged buyer contrib-
utes a net social loss.
Imagine, for example, buyers A through E, willing to pay
$12, $10, $8, $7, and $6, respectively, for a good that costs a
seller, S, just $5 to produce.  Three other buyers, F, G, and H,
would each pay $7 for the good, but they fear exploitation, as
they are inferior hagglers.  They do not want to negotiate, and
so will patronize S only if pricing is uniform.  Buyers I and J
might buy if the good were priced at $4, but they will be priced
out of the market regardless of S’s strategy, because it is ineffi-
cient and unprofitable to sell to these low-valuing buyers a
good that costs $5 to make.
If S charges a uniform price of $6 or $7, then eight buyers,
including F, G, and H, will gladly purchase the good.  If S does
not haggle, and seeks to maximize the profit available in his
market position, then S can sell to these eight at a price of $6,
for a profit of $48 – $40 = $8.  All buyers who value the good
above its cost of production are satisfied, so there is no dead-
weight loss.  But S, as a monopolist, can do better by restricting
output.  If S prices the good at $7, E will be inefficiently ex-
cluded, because E is willing to pay $6 for a good that costs $5 to
produce.  But with seven sales at $7, S earns $49 – $35 = $14.
This is the familiar decision by a monopolist to restrict output
incur preparation costs prior to a negotiation may be dissuaded from reaching an
efficient bargain).  Here, buyers may refuse to transact where haggling is required,
even when they value the good more than its price, if their disutility from haggling
exceeds the consumer surplus.
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in order to increase profits.20  Any further restriction is less
profitable.  For example, at a uniform price of $8, S will sell
three units with profit of $24 – $15 = $9.
S does yet better if he is a good haggler.  If he haggles with
A through E, writing off the three who will not patronize a
haggler, S can price discriminate and take in as much as $43
with costs of production amounting to $25, for a profit of $18.21
Even if some of these buyers are proficient hagglers them-
selves, S might nonetheless prefer to haggle.  If, for instance, C
and E are good hagglers, able to split the available surplus with
the seller, then C might haggle to $6.5 (halfway between $8 and
$5) and E to $5.5.  Note that C and E are better off than where S
is a straightforward uniform-pricing monopolist.  Even so, S’s
revenue is $12 + $10 + $6.5 + $7 + $5.5 = $41, and with costs of
$25, this leaves a profit of $16.  Haggling redistributes from
buyers to sellers, and mostly from the unskilled to the skilled
haggler, but it can increase deadweight loss, because consum-
ers who are put off by haggling go unserved.  This is the es-
sence of the discouraged-buyer problem.
Conventional economic theory concludes that successful
haggling, and other price discrimination tactics, increases effi-
ciency (or has no impact on it), but the novelty here is that
haggling is like a tax on some customers, and it can increase
inefficiency even as it increases the seller’s profit.22  A price-
discriminating monopolist, as discussed in Part III, can be
more socially efficient than a normal (uniform-price) monopo-
list, but not necessarily so if haggling is the means of discrimi-
nation and it discourages some consumers.  The seller will still
want to haggle, even at the cost of losing some profitable buy-
ers, but it is often more socially efficient to disallow haggling.
In the preceding example, haggling squeezed out three buyers,
20 PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 8, at 369.  The example assumes no close
competitor, who would undercut S and charge a price closer to the marginal cost,
5.
21 43 is the sum of the amounts A through E are willing to pay (12 + 10 + 8 + 7
+ 6 = 43).
22 Haggling is like an excise tax, though of course it is allowed rather than
imposed by any government.  Buyers can exit the market and escape the tax, but
when they do so there is an inefficiency compared to the first-best allocation of
resources.  If there are markets with few discouraged buyers, the inefficiency
problem identified here is small, and might be more than offset by a desirable
feature of haggling or simply by the cost of imposing the uniformity-or-trans-
parency rule. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.  On the other hand, if
large groups of consumers are regularly discouraged by haggling, as discussed in
subpart II.E (citing evidence about gender disparities in negotiation and pay),
then a uniformity-or-transparency rule is easily justified and may even be too
weak a legal intervention.
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while a non-haggling monopolist left just one out in the cold.
Note that this social inefficiency we have associated with hag-
gling is present even where S has complete information about
F, G, and H’s preference for not haggling.  Buyers F, G, and H
simply exit the market because their preference for not hag-
gling is independent of price; S maximizes profit across all buy-
ers by haggling with A, B, C, D, and E.23
If haggling imposes a net cost on the economy, we might
expect it to be eliminated through competition.  Indeed, in the
most competitive environments, some sellers appeal to hag-
glers and some to non-hagglers; for every used car lot with
sticker prices and no haggling, there are several where haggling
is the norm; most appliance stores negotiate prices, though
several do not.  But the competitors in these markets are not
otherwise identical and, often, markets are too thin to accom-
modate this variety, or choice, between negotiable and uniform
prices.  Even in the most competitive markets, some goods do
not come in multiple colors or sizes, so the absence of choice is
unsurprising.  This raises the question of whether a single
seller could offer both haggling and non-haggling options.  Ide-
ally, S would like to haggle with A through E, and also sell to F,
G, and H at a price of $6 or $7.  However, public sales to these
three buyers will normally make it impossible for S to convince
a buyer like A to pay $12, or even a haggler like C to pay $6.5.
When prices are nonpublic and buyers can be acoustically
separated, an ambitious seller can try to have it both ways, in
which case the overall result will be more efficient.  A merchant
that offers uniform pricing can also offer to match a better price
found at a competitor.  This hybrid pricing may be a signal of
competitive prices or, in some cases, an attempt to attract com-
mitted hagglers and perhaps to price discriminate, while offer-
ing uniform prices to most consumers.  More creatively, an
automobile dealer might invite customers who do not want to
haggle to name a price after observing the sticker price in the
showroom, with the seller promising to accept or reject the
offer, and no possibility of further bargaining.  Alternatively,
the seller could promise to make just one counteroffer.24  Simi-
23 Even if F, G, and H have interdependent preferences with regard to hag-
gling and price, they may exit simply because they expect the haggler’s price to be
too high given their inferior haggling abilities.
24 Another alternative is the reverse of normal retail sales; the seller could
state no price at all and promise to accept or reject an offer made by each buyer.  It
is easy to see why this would be unpopular.  The party that states a price in this
one-time game needs to invest more in order to determine that price, and the
seller is the repeat player with more information.
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larly, a Dean could invite a prospective faculty member to an-
nounce a compensation package that she commits to accept if
the Dean also agrees.  Alternatively, the clever anti-haggling
faculty member could ask for a promise that she will always be
paid at least as much as the first or second-highest paid person
with similar seniority.  In both cases the repeat player promises
not to haggle, and over time that party might develop a reputa-
tion for keeping promises not to haggle, even as that party
haggles with other buyers.  This idea is of game-theoretic inter-
est but it is impractical, and it will normally force the non-
haggler to engage in additional search.  Moreover, in almost all
cases it is impossible for the seller to identify these two groups
of buyers in advance, and it is also impossible to do better by
offering a take-it-or-leave-it contract to all buyers, followed by
an announcement of a price to those who accept the no-haggle
path, and negotiation with those who did not.25
2. Anti-Haggling and Economizing on Search Costs
Some buyers might prefer a private seller to a professional
seller, because they would rather buy from—and even haggle
with—an amateur than a superior bargainer.  An experienced
seller of used vehicles, to focus on one example, will have devel-
oped skill in reading buyers’ expressions and manners.  But
other buyers will overestimate their own haggling abilities, and
sellers who survive and thrive in the market are likely to be
those who expertly profit at the expense of these buyers.  A
buyer who purchases from a neighbor or from an individual
who advertises on Craigslist might on average expect to share
any bargaining surplus with the equally inexperienced seller.
The buyer requires a discount because the warranty is weaker,
and a lemon is more likely,26 but the buyer knows that a pro-
fessional will extract more of the surplus than will an amateur
seller.  Correspondingly, the buyer may inefficiently inspect the
vehicle or take it to a mechanic for evaluation, knowing that the
nonrepeat seller is unlikely to be held to a high disclosure
standard.
The professional’s advantage in haggling, rather than in
acquiring or simply possessing information about the quality of
25 S would like to sell a no-haggle experience to some buyers, but the an-
nounced price for the good acts as a ceiling for hagglers, unless S can somehow
keep each group ignorant of the other’s prices, while also preventing arbitrage.
The assumptions are too heroic to pursue here.
26 See Charles W. Smithson & Christopher R. Thomas, Measuring the Cost to
Consumers of Product Defects: The Value of “Lemon Insurance,” 31 J.L. & ECON.
485, 485 n.1 (1988).
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the vehicle, leads buyers to gather information.  They are apt to
engage in more comparison shopping and research than they
would for other goods in order to arm themselves with informa-
tion that enables them to recognize decent offers from these
sellers of used vehicles.  The sellers, in turn, presumably gain
more of the surplus when buyers are poorly informed not only
about the vehicles they inspect but also about alternatives in
the market.  In this particular market, the professional seller
can also benefit when haggling over a vehicle that the buyer
trades in as well as from the buyer’s lack of sophistication
about financing the vehicle.
The same asymmetry is found in the market for new vehi-
cles, except that it is easier for buyers to be informed about
prices because the vehicles are more homogenous than are
used vehicles of a given model.  Quality is so well known, or
observable, that extensive warranties are easier to sell.  Even
buyers who do not purchase supplemental warranties, but
take them as reliable signals of quality, receive substantial
warranties with every new car.  In this sort of market, and with
modern communication, buyers have almost as much informa-
tion about prices as they do in the stock market, where shares
of a given “brand” are perfectly homogenous, and they probably
have more information about expected quality.  Still, there is
haggling, and here the professional seller has a great advan-
tage.  Popular models may be hard to come by; unwanted ac-
cessories may be embedded in a given vehicle; aftermarket
treatments are pushed on inexperienced and risk-averse buy-
ers; and financing is a major profit center for the seller.  In all
these matters, the seller has more information, outcomes are
likely to be unequal among buyers, and, when buyers inform
themselves, their efforts are duplicative of work already done
by others.
Unsurprisingly, innovative sellers occasionally enter the
used and new car markets in order to profit from some of the
inefficiencies just described.  In the case of new cars, General
Motors introduced Saturn, a brand aimed at inexperienced car
buyers, and especially women, looking for small, inexpensive
vehicles as well as a no-haggle environment.27  A Saturn dealer
27 George P. Blumberg, To Sell a Car that Women Love, It Helps if Women Sell
It, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/26/automo-
biles/autospecial/to-sell-a-car-that-women-love-it-helps-if-women.html [https:/
/perma.cc/GXF3-A9ZV].  In fact, at least one study showed that Saturn buyers
were more male compared to other cars.  Thomas J. Cosse´ & Terry M. Weisen-
berger, Saturn Buyers: Are They Different?, 5 J. MARKETING THEORY & PRAC. 77, 82
(1997).  When gender is evaluated against psychographic variables, the study
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with high inventory could lower a price, but in that case the
price would be lowered for all consumers looking at that vehi-
cle.  Prices would not depend on the haggling skills or informa-
tion enjoyed by a particular buyer.  Similarly, CarMax has
become a major force at the high end of the used-car market.  It
also promises uniform prices, or no haggling, as well as fairly
inclusive warranties to back up its promise that the automo-
biles in stock have been carefully inspected.  The implication is
that no duplicative inspection by buyers is necessary.  CarMax
has survived and at times thrived, but Saturn has folded—
though perhaps not because of its pricing strategy.28  Tesla is
now the standard-bearer for haggle-free auto sales, but it is
better known for its batteries and design, and it is hardly a test
of consumer preferences for no-haggling.  Tesla’s unique brand
overcomes a problem that Saturn faced; buyers who are at-
tracted to a no-haggling alternative must fear that they will lose
out precisely because this seller aims to attract those buyers
who most expect to lose in a haggling process.  Buyers might
pay a premium for no-haggling.  In most markets with set, no-
haggle prices, ranging from stock markets to conventional de-
partment stores where prices are marked and employees are
not empowered to negotiate over prices, uninformed buyers
can free ride on active buyers who engage in comparison shop-
ping and discipline sellers.  But if no-haggle sellers constitute a
small part of a market, and aim to serve inexperienced buyers,
these buyers may reason that while the prices are set, they are
likely to be higher than those found where other, more exper-
ienced or adventurous buyers dare to go.
There is evidence that women and African-Americans ob-
tain worse, which is to say higher, prices at car dealerships.29
Perhaps they are on average less experienced hagglers or, as
finds that males purchased Saturns because they were more likely to take advan-
tage of other people’s search efforts due to an antipathy to shopping; females
purchased Saturns because they were “seriously opposed to negotiations, more so
than men.” Id.  Note the possibility of freeriding by men and women on the
comparison shopping undertaken by some enthusiastic shoppers.
28 See Abigail Evans, Note, Cooperation or Co-Optation: When Does a Union
Become Employer-Dominated Under Section 8(A)(2) of the National Labor Relations
Act?, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1022, 1047–58 (2000); David Hanna, How GM Destroyed
Its Saturn Success, FORBES (Mar. 8, 2010), https://www.forbes.com/2010/03/
08/saturn-gm-innovation-leadership-managing-failure.html [https://perma.cc/
96QR-GEA7].
29 Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Nego-
tiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817, 819 (1991); see also Nancy Leong & Aaron Belzer,
The New Public Accommodations: Race Discrimination in the Platform Economy,
105 GEO. L.J. 1271, 1289–96 (2017) (noting that online markets have not elimi-
nated race discrimination).
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the sparse but carefully developed evidence suggests, salespe-
ople are less inclined to reduce prices when dealing with these
buyers, and perhaps especially so if the salespeople are them-
selves minorities.30  The sellers might perceive these buyers to
be inferior hagglers or they may think these buyers are less
inclined to walk away from a high offer lest they offend or
disadvantage the salesperson.  This last perception could be a
kind of profiling or stereotyping, or it could be a matter of
reading individuals, and a higher proportion of women or Afri-
can-Americans are perceived to be of this type.  The argument
here does not depend on this sort of discrimination, but une-
qual outcomes that disadvantage women or a racial minority
are troubling.  In the housing market, if testers discover that
the same apartment is offered to whites on better terms than it
is to minorities, then there is a prima facie violation of the
Equal Housing Act.31  The problem, if it exists, is almost surely
less serious in the market for automobiles because arbitrage is
possible; in the housing market, sellers deal with a named
buyer in order to do a credit check.  Still, it is hard to see why
discrimination of this kind should be acceptable in any
market.32
Even in the absence of discrimination linked to gender or
race, it is easy to see the inefficiency of a system that requires
buyers to invest duplicatively in gathering information.  Put
differently, when car dealers haggle over prices, it is plainly to
extract higher prices from unskilled hagglers or uninformed
buyers.  If the purpose of haggling is to exploit the uninformed
or naı¨ve, then it seems sensible to improve the lot of the latter if
this can be done at low cost, and if the alternative is to en-
courage the duplicative and inefficient acquisition of informa-
tion or to suffer the social loss associated with discouraged
buyers.
Haggling as practiced through the ages is more defensible.
It eliminated the need to attach a price to every item offered for
sale.33  Even in fairly modern times, when sticker prices
30 See Ian Ayres, Further Evidence of Discrimination in New Car Negotiations
and Estimates of Its Cause, 94 MICH. L. REV. 109, 133–36 (1995) (finding evidence
of higher pricing between nonwhite salespersons and nonwhite buyers).
31 See, e.g., Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043, 1051, 1053 (9th Cir. 1999); see
also Lee Anne Fennell, Searching for Fair Housing, 97 B.U. L. REV. 349 (2017)
(examining bias in consumers’ search for housing).
32 The discussion returns to this question in the context of employment in
subpart II.E.
33 There were also fewer items for sale, and therefore more expert consumers.
See supra section I.C.1.
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abound, uniform pricing can be costly in an environment
where market conditions change and prices must adjust.  But
even this is no longer a problem because prices can be stated
online, or even posted digitally on shelves,34 where they are
easily changed and inspected, and where formulaic pricing can
operate without any additional labor cost on the seller’s part.
The older practice is found in some open-air markets and tour-
ist stalls where it is surely the case that haggling exploits the
amateurs, even as it might give some utility to (other) tourists
who enjoy the game that their forbears thrived or starved by.
Haggling might be untroubling, even if it were inefficient, if
it redistributed wealth from the rich to the poor.  Imagine, for
example, that because haggling is time consuming, high earn-
ers dispensed with it while low-earning buyers engaged in it in
order to get lower prices.  In this case, haggling is defensible
and not terribly inefficient, especially because high-earning
buyers might also not find it worthwhile to invest in informa-
tion in order to carry out quick and better negotiations.  A
comparison to queues is instructive.  If a seller such as a con-
cert promoter restricts quantity or otherwise structures sales
so that many tickets are available only to patrons who camp
out and form overnight queues, law can respect the private
market and its apparent inefficiency; the professional seller
seems to lose money rather than exploit the uninformed.  The
seller can offer nontransferable tickets, and ask law to enforce
the restriction, and perhaps also ask legislators to pass anti-
scalping laws.  The promoter may be signaling the high quality
of the performance, because overnight lines are more visible
than high prices.  Similarly, the seller and the performers may
seek to form a community of fans who will be loyal customers
in the future, and such a community is encouraged by all-night
vigils and a little hardship.  But these situations and rational-
izations are unusual.  In most settings, it is plain that bargain-
ing is not an equal-opportunity activity, for it is a skill that
improves with experience, self-confidence, access to informa-
tion, and willingness to convey half-truths.
34 See Randall Stross, Digital Tags Help Ensure the Price Is Right, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/10/technology/digital-tags-
help-ensure-that-the-price-is-right.html [https://perma.cc/DLN4-5WLU].
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II
UNIFORMITY OR TRANSPARENCY IN CONSUMER
TRANSACTIONS
A. Uniformity or Transparency
If negotiable prices bring on duplicative search costs and
additional inefficiencies associated with discouraged buyers,
then law can improve markets by ameliorating these problems.
The obvious solution, and one that many sellers choose be-
cause of competitive pressure or their own organizational
costs, is uniform pricing.  There is no haggling, and therefore,
there are no discouraged buyers; moreover, with uniform pric-
ing, buyers can reduce their search costs because they can rely
on comparison shopping by fellow buyers.  Presumably, law
could simply require uniform pricing, but this radical interven-
tion in the interest of efficiency is inappropriate because there
may be good reasons for negotiable prices in some settings.
Moreover, there is another solution to the problems introduced
in Part I, and it is to ensure that prices, if not uniform, are more
transparent.  By transparent we mean much more than the
clear posting or communication of current prices; we include
the sort of transparency that will reduce search costs and bring
otherwise discouraged buyers to the market.  Where prices are
negotiable, buyers require information about current and past
prices.  A transparency requirement, as the word is used here,
forces sellers to disclose the prices obtained by other buyers in
comparable transactions.  Thus, in an auto dealership we im-
agine that a buyer who asks about a Toyota Camry must (in the
presence of a legally imposed transparency requirement) see
the prices paid by all buyers of that model in the last thirty
days; if there are more than ten such sales, the seller can
simply disclose the last ten sales and their prices.35  The con-
ception here is that the law require certain sellers to provide
either uniformity or transparency, though the details of the
35 If transparency is required by statute or agency rule, as discussed in Part
III, a plausible rule is that the seller must post the last ten transactions of compa-
rable items where the actual sales price deviated from the marked or listed price.
If there are fewer than ten transactions in the preceding thirty days, then the
seller can disclose all the transactions in that period.  In a setting with no listed
prices, the seller must disclose the information for comparable items.  The num-
ber of transactions is less important than satisfying the tenet that transparency
must be informative enough to substitute for continued search. See infra subpart
II.E.  For example, if a buyer is looking at washing machines in a store that sells
appliances, the seller must have posted or clearly disclosed the last ten sales of
washers, along with the prices that were marked at the time.  A buyer will then get
a good idea of the range of negotiation, if any.
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transparency requirement, while illustrated here, need to be
worked out.  Either one will reduce the problem of duplicative
search costs as well as the problem of discouraged buyers.
Haggling begets duplicative information-gathering, and can
push many consumers to the rental market or other less effi-
cient alternatives.  These inefficiencies can be reduced by re-
quiring the better and already-informed party to disclose
information that will otherwise be duplicatively sought.
In some industries, competition, and especially online
competition, has benefited consumers by reducing search
costs, and it has often done so with a combination of uniformity
and transparency.  In the case of airline seats, for example, it is
plainly unwise to buy the first or second seat available when
contemplating a flight between two major cities on a given day.
On the other hand, a modern airline website allows the con-
sumer to compare many flights across several days.  Most air-
lines use hidden and complex pricing algorithms, but by and
large the consumer can shop quickly and effectively.  A careful
consumer will also check another airline’s website, or that of an
aggregator like Expedia but, again, competition keeps these
prices in line with one another.  Prices are not quite negotiable;
they are uniform, in the sense that all buyers can see the
variation across classes of seats, time of day, and changing
market conditions.  If technology allows sellers to discriminate
among buyers because of access to buyers’ information and
online practices, then it must be conceded that nonuniform
pricing will not lead to wasteful, duplicative searches by buy-
ers.  At present, the variations make some search worthwhile,
but it is inexpensive to search.  The industry has evolved from
nontransparency (when passengers engaged in inefficient and
duplicative searches for pricing information) to intermediation
by travel agents (so that consumers paid others to search), to
the present state of near-transparency, if not uniformity.  The
evolution has been fueled by competitive pressure and techno-
logical change rather than by law.  Our concern here is with
less transparent or simply less competitive markets.
In other industries, sellers have moved entirely to uniform
pricing.  Thus, a large department store can be understood as a
seller that sets relatively fixed, or uniform, prices for all cus-
tomers and, indeed, is ill-equipped to bargain with individual
buyers.  In most cases, the seller can and must lower prices as
time goes by or as inventories accumulate, but such discounts
are offered to all buyers at that time; a wary buyer will not
worry that the seller is taking advantage of the latter’s superior
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bargaining ability.  In turn, the seller can employ unskilled
agents because the seller does not empower these agents to
bargain over prices.36  The department store essentially adver-
tises as follows:
We are like a well-developed stock market, offering you signif-
icant transparency and a no-haggling environment.  You can
see our prices, and sometimes even the history of prices and
quantities traded,37 and you can be sure that the prices
available to you are identical to those offered to everyone else.
They rise and fall with demand and supply, but they do so for
everyone.  As in securities markets, it is possible that sophis-
ticated traders willing to take long and short positions can
profit, but at least compared to other retail options available
to you, pricing is transparent, and we do not exploit our
expertise by bargaining with you.  Indeed, you might exploit
your expertise or brand loyalty by paying attention to infor-
mation about periodic and available coupons.
A typical buyer does not know the size of the store’s inventory
or the commissions that various salespeople receive, but the
department store gains little advantage in sizing up individual
buyers.  At a given moment, all buyers face the same prices.
Moreover, it would be difficult for law to enforce a requirement
that these sellers or institutions provide yet more
transparency.38
A law school, in the business of selling seats in its entering
class, could do the same—though at present no law school
behaves in the manner of a department store.39  A school could
36 Causation might run in the opposite direction.  The owner of a large de-
partment store may save agency costs by setting inflexible prices that are lowered,
if at all, on a storewide or department-wide basis without reference to the inexpe-
rience or characteristics of individual patrons.  In turn, the store will appeal to
buyers who do not want to haggle.  It may offer competitive prices because some
buyers will engage in comparison shopping; other buyers can free-ride.
37 Quantities sold are normally observed only by repeat and experienced
shoppers who observe the decline in inventories.
38 There are important differences between consumer and investor markets.
Consumers have preferences that can generate purchases at relatively high prices
by informed and sophisticated participants.  It can be rational to buy a clothing
item or an Apple Watch on the first day it is available even if one knows that the
price will drop in the near future.  But overall the department store and the stock
market have much in common, and yet the latter is more regulated and therefore
transparent.  This is a function of history and the likelihood of large-scale insider
informational advantages.
39 A very few law schools advertise better prices for students with specified
credentials, but it is likely that these schools are prepared to negotiate with these
students as well as with candidates whose credentials fall just below the indicated
cutoffs. See, e.g., Scholarships and Financial Aid, W. MICH. U. COOLEY SCH. L.,
http://www.cooley.edu/prospective/scholarships.html [https://perma.cc/
K5N5-27CP] (last visited July 26, 2017).
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announce that all students pay the sticker price, or that
$20,000 tuition discounts are offered to all students with
scores above x on the Law School Admissions Test (LSAT).
There would be no room to bargain, and thus no reason to
engage in duplicative information gathering.
B. Transparency and Uniformity in Action: Automobiles,
Medical Services, and Law School Tuition
Imagine a rug merchant who is suddenly required to dis-
close the price history of the firm’s sales, unless it switches to
nonnegotiable fixed (uniform) prices.  If many of the rugs are
identical, perhaps machine-made, a buyer will quickly see the
average price per square foot, and have a good idea of the
market value of a rug under consideration.  Even if the rugs are
unique, a list of recent sale prices will help the buyer ask what
is different about a rug in question.  Buyers who learn that
others recently purchased rugs at a price of $20 per square
foot, will be less willing to purchase a similar rug at a price of
$50 per square foot.40  In turn, sellers will reduce price dispari-
ties unless they are related to the merchant’s costs, and they
will have less reason to size up buyers in order to estimate their
willingness to pay or to compare prices.  Note that this pro-
posed transparency requirement does not eliminate price dis-
crimination and does not completely eliminate a buyer’s
inclination to search.41  The seller can charge more per square
foot for larger (or smaller) rugs; the seller can try to charge
more when the buyer pulls up in an expensive car; and the
seller can try to charge more to buyers of one sex or race.
These are all plausible methods of extracting consumer sur-
plus with nonuniform prices.  But these patterns of price dis-
crimination, a topic largely deferred to Part III, are less likely to
succeed when the buyer can see a posted history of recent
sales.  To be sure, as these methods of price discrimination
become more difficult, because buyers are armed with informa-
tion (requiring virtually no effort or duplication on their part),
merchants might raise prices at the low end, or charge a uni-
form price that excludes some buyers who would have paid
more than marginal cost.  More complete price discrimination
40 Note that a single rug merchant has little incentive to disclose price history
to capture market share so long as any increase in sales is less valuable than
price discrimination.
41 A buyer might move to a second seller after gaining information from the
first seller’s transparency.  The buyer enjoys lower search costs, but might still be
on guard against the possibility that there are lower prices to find.  Price aggre-
gators help reduce these costs in familiar online shopping.
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will benefit some buyers, while it harms others and benefits the
seller.  But buyers in the aggregate will almost surely benefit, if
only because their search costs are reduced with more infor-
mation.  The major danger of disclosure is that it can facilitate
collusion among sellers, though this is unlikely in the case of
rug merchants.42  And when buyers benefit, it will be not only
because of the prices they pay, but also because they will not
need to waste as many resources on duplicative searches.
Moreover, with increased information about past prices, many
discouraged buyers are likely to participate in the market.  Fi-
nally, if the merchant switches to uniform pricing, then the
discouraged buyer problem vanishes, and search costs are also
reduced.
Merchants can and will adapt to any requirement, or even
market norm, of transparency.  They might categorize rugs and
increase the premiums on some in order to reduce the effect
that disclosure has on pricing.  A buyer who is offered rug x at a
price of $1,000 will be told that it is one of a kind, or that only
rug y, sold last week for $1,200, was from the same country of
origin, of similar size, and comparable stitches per inch.  In
fact, an expert would say that rugs u and v were more like x,
and they sold at $700 and $750.  Transparency has not made
the buyer’s problem worse; the merchant can always be
42 There is a danger that transparency could induce coordination and price
fixing among merchants, especially where merchants are able to view each other’s
price histories, but this risk remains low in competitive markets.  For instance,
when the Supreme Court struck down a Rhode Island advertising ban on liquor
prices, prices for advertised liquor products fell by an estimated 20%.  Jeffrey
Milyo & Joel Waldfogel, The Effect of Price Advertising on Prices: Evidence in the
Wake of 44 Liquormart, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 1081, 1091 (1999).  More advertising
likely led to reduced search costs for price information, which led to increased
comparison shopping and intensified price competition.  Similarly, researchers
have documented a 4-5% decline in prices following implementation of mandatory
price disclosure throughout the Israeli food retail market. See Itai Ater & Oren
Rigbi, The Effects of Mandatory Disclosure of Supermarket Prices, No. 12381 CEPR
Discussion Paper, Oct. 2017. On the other hand, where markets tend toward
oligopoly, transparency may enable cartel members to observe deviations and
more easily enforce price fixing. See Ralf Deventer, Ulrich Heimeshoff & Hendrik
Lu¨th, The Impact of the Market Transparency Unit for Fuels on Gasoline Prices in
Germany, DICE Discussion Paper No. 220, May 2016 (documenting an increase in
German gasoline and diesel prices following the introduction of transparency).
Where data-driven algorithms monitor and adjust to competitors’ prices, there is a
danger that transparency can facilitate collusion, though this concern seems
unwarranted in relatively competitive markets.  For example, third-party Amazon
sellers are able to view prices offered by other sellers and often respond by mark-
ing prices downward, not upward.  Nonetheless, new forms of collusion may re-
quire innovative applications of antitrust law. See ARIEL EZRACHI & MAURICE E.
STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION: THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF THE ALGORITHM-DRIVEN
ECONOMY 247–48 (2016).
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counted on to provide information suggesting that x is a bar-
gain.  But in most cases the buyer will have more information
and can reduce her search costs.  She can see for herself that
there are attractive rugs other than x and y, and she can ask
about their quality, knowing that rugs like u and v sold for
prices of $700 and $750.
In the case of automobiles, price transparency through
consumer-oriented magazines and websites has encouraged
dealers to offer varied and expensive aftermarket treatments
and financing packages.  Vulnerable and uninformed buyers
lose out, while other buyers engage in duplicative search for
alternative sellers, as dealers try to extract the disposable in-
come that uninformed buyers bring to the showroom.  But
these sales of add-ons and loan packages can also be subject to
a transparency requirement; in particular, sellers could be re-
quired to disclose not only the price history of various options
but also the fraction of buyers who decline each add-on.43
Thus, an uninformed consumer who learns that most buyers of
an expensive automobile reject an extended warranty, might
think harder before purchasing the proffered warranty; alter-
natively, the price of the extended warranty might drop.  In any
event, and especially where buyers can easily understand the
qualities and categories that are priced, transparency reduces
search costs and, often, prices as well.
Prices for medical treatment could similarly be reduced
through disclosure of price histories.  Patients are often igno-
rant, or completely dependent on their doctors’ recommenda-
tions, when choosing among alternative treatments.  When a
diagnosis is clear and the treatment standard, hospitals are
likely to differentiate themselves by price, experience, and suc-
cess rates.  Consumer knowledge of a treatment’s price history
will exert a downward pressure on pricing, so long as some
patients are sensitive to price and hospitals are unable to raise
or maintain high prices through coordination.  Price sensitivity
is greatest among uninsured and under-insured patients, but
the introduction of in-network pricing, preferred providers,
provider-insurers, and even prices set by governments, can be
understood as the product of greater demand for transparency
by insurers.  The provision of transparent pricing to insured
patients, as written into the Affordable Care Act,44 may exert
43 But this requirement goes beyond the proposal developed here, which is by
its terms limited to price information.
44 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 300gg–18(e) (2010) (“Each hospital operating within the United States shall for
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still greater downward pressure on prices inasmuch as trans-
parency reduces care costs to insurers.  Even patients with
small amounts at stake are able to foster competition by choos-
ing among providers.45 Common sense suggests that a paying
patient who learns that a large insurer has negotiated a price of
$2,000 for a procedure will be less likely to accept a quoted
price of $5,000 for the same procedure.  The uninsured, or
partly insured, patient—now better informed—is more likely to
check prices at competing facilities, or simply to negotiate with
the first provider.46  Again, it is possible that uniform pricing is
a more efficient solution, as it further reduces the individual
patient’s search costs.  Essentially, the individual can piggy-
back on the insurance company’s negotiated price if the pro-
vider must charge the same price to all patients.  Uniformity
would spur enormous change in this industry.  On the other
hand, it is plausible that some price differentials fairly reflect
the lower transaction costs that a hospital experiences with the
bulk-purchasing insurer.  Similarly, a lower price might com-
pensate the buyer-insurer for its promise to direct all its in-
sureds to the particular hospital.  In turn, the hospital might
make a more informed decision about the scale of facilities or
number of personnel to employ.  All these considerations sug-
gest that the more conservative and defensible approach is to
require uniformity or transparency.  Some sellers might re-
each year establish (and update) and make public (in accordance with guidelines
developed by the Secretary) a list of the hospital’s standard charges for items and
services provided by the hospital, including for diagnosis-related groups estab-
lished under section 1395ww(d)(4) of this title.”); see also Requirement for Trans-
parency of Hospital Changes Under the Affordable Care Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 50,145,
145–46 (Aug. 22, 2014) (giving discretion to hospitals on manner and method of
making information public in final rule implementation).  Note that transparency
must be informative enough to reduce duplicative search costs. See subpart II.E.
45 In a single-payer system, where the state bargains for care from private
organizations, transparency is inherent since there is one buyer, the state, that
can easily keep a record of its transactions.  If the state employs its own medical
personnel, there is no bargaining.  In either case, increased efficiency from a
reduction in search costs is not implicated.  Many states mandate some form of
transparency and maintain “all-payer claims databases,” but only a few states
publish price information for a wide scope of procedures and services on an
accessible website available to consumers. See FRANC¸OIS DE BRANTES & SUZANNE
DELBANCO, HEALTH CARE INCENTIVES IMPROVEMENT INST., REPORT CARD ON STATE PRICE
TRANSPARENCY LAWS 1 (2016), http://www.hci3.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/
07/reportcard2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DDY-937N] (giving high marks only
to Colorado, Maine, and New Hampshire).
46 See, for example, PRICING HEALTHCARE, https://pricinghealthcare.com/
[https://perma.cc/69MH-9MJ7] (last visited Feb. 12, 2018), which markets pro-
vider-uploaded price lists for comparison shopping to patients with high
deductibles.
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spond with uniformity, as it naturally provides transparency
and, in any event, reduces the inefficiencies identified here.
Finally, we return to law school admissions and tuition
payments.  If schools were required to disclose net tuition infor-
mation (with some protection of privacy), along with relevant
information such as undergraduate grades and LSAT scores,
prospective students would engage in less duplicative search-
ing, and schools would have much less of an advantage as
compared to ill-informed admitted students, who do not know
how hard to bargain for scholarships or tuition discounts.  If a
law school bucked the trend and sought something other than
improved national ranking, it could disclose its prices, or schol-
arships, accordingly.  Thus, a school could disclose that its
tuition is $50,000, but scholarships of w, x, y, and z were
offered to and accepted by applicants with scores of p, q, r, s,
and t.  If a discount had been given to someone with work
experience, or to someone who brought diversity to the student
body, that too could be disclosed, unless lawmakers decided
that the law’s interest in diversity requires that schools not be
asked to reveal net prices for students in certain categories.47
Either way, this approach gives the school an opportunity to
design and carve categories, albeit ex post and even strategi-
cally, but it provides buyers with much more information than
they have at present.  Note that if buyers search for information
about a school’s pricing strategy, as some do at present, they
may inaccurately assess the strategy, but the prices they dis-
cover will nevertheless be useful in reducing search costs.  For
example, a prospective student, S, might learn that two other
students, T and U, received larger scholarships than did V and
W with the same scores.  S might attribute T and U’s good
fortune to the fact that they had been interns for a judge, as
disclosed by the law school in question.  S may be wrong; the
47 On the other hand, if the prices paid by African-American students are, for
instance, excluded, then other African-Americans will not benefit from the trans-
parency rule, as they will need to acquire information in order to negotiate better
deals.  In our framework, excluding certain price information from a transparency
requirement is equivalent to recognizing that the benefit of eliminating duplicative
searching within a single group of students does not exceed the reduction in
dynamic efficiency (i.e., the longer-term diversity benefits that accrue to society
due to university investment) gained from engaging in price discrimination across
multiple groups of students.  It is implied that full transparency will reduce a
school’s ability to offer different scholarships based on race, perhaps because
there may be public backlash or even litigation.  We express no view here on the
correct balance among diversity, democratic openness, and the ability of private
schools to invest in diversity as they like.  The point is simply that full trans-
parency alters the likely balance.
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law school may have valued the business startup experience
that T and U offered, or it may have sought gender balance, as
offered by these applicants, in the entering class.  These fea-
tures may not have been made apparent in the school’s disclo-
sure, and a requirement of full disclosure of the reasons for
each price variation would be unenforceable and unworkable.
Nevertheless, S is better informed with the disclosure than
without it.48  In short, even if schools respond to a uniformity-
or-transparency rule not by offering uniform, nonnegotiable
prices, and not with perfect disclosure in the spirit of the trans-
parency requirement, but by divulging pricing information that
hides their true pricing strategies, buyers will expend fewer
resources in the (duplicative) hunt for information.
We do not claim that transparency will entirely eliminate
duplicative searching by prospective law students.  Even with
uniformity there will be a small amount of duplicative compari-
son shopping.  But however schools respond to a uniformity-
or-transparency requirement, it is almost surely the case that
students will engage in less duplicative information-gathering.
The gain may be less (or more) than that enjoyed by consumers
in other markets, such as hospital patients.  Uninformed stu-
dents who are subsidized by their families or by government
loans may be less price-sensitive than is ideal.  They may sim-
ply believe that high prices signal quality and high future earn-
ings.  But transparency will surely reduce search costs, and
that is our primary aim and claim here.
Might a law school offer transparency in the absence of a
legal requirement?  The discussion in our Conclusion, Paths to
Transparency, suggests some consumer-initiated means to
this end, but it is easy to imagine a seller taking the lead.  One
way to differentiate oneself and attract customers is to offer
services that competitors do not, and this is what we observe
48 It is tempting to suggest that schools run (and disclose) multi-variable
regressions in order to reveal the several factors that go into their merit scholar-
ship decisions.  Time might be one of these factors, as scholarships rise and fall
depending on the school’s inclination to reach a higher median GPA or LSAT with
the last few transactions.  But more disclosure threatens information overload,
and for the present it is enough to propose uniformity-or-transparency as to price,
without over-specifying the price of what, exactly.  The discussion in the text
suggests that information provided by the seller is more reliable than that availa-
ble from fellow consumers, through crowdsourcing, both because the seller in fact
develops the pricing strategy and because the seller might be held responsible for
false disclosures.  Crowdsourcing should not, however, be underestimated; it has
been the force behind increased negotiation regarding law school tuitions, and
there are surely settings where consumers trust the information from (even) anon-
ymous peers more than any they receive from their adversary, the seller.
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on airline websites, with more disclosure over time.  Similarly,
some sellers might have started offering uniform pricing, not
because their internal agency costs made it unwise to delegate
price-cutting and haggling to employees on the floor, but be-
cause buyers gravitated to stores where they did not need to
haggle, and where prices were sometimes revealed in advertise-
ments in advance of any commitment to travel to the given
store.  In the case of law school admissions, however, con-
sumer decision-making is not spontaneous and is rarely done
when visiting the seller.  A law school, L1, that offered trans-
parency, providing a full list of accepted offers with information
about prices, scores, grades, and perhaps other information,
would lose its bargaining advantage and end up collecting less
(net) tuition for the same “quality” applicant.  Meanwhile, a
comparable law school, L2, would not lose students to L1, as-
suming that students apply to both schools.49  At first, L2
might be advantaged by L1’s disclosures; if L1 offers tuition
discounts, often steeper the more competitive the student, L2
can design its own pricing strategy, and perhaps compete away
students at the margins of L1’s groupings.  In the long run,
however, as L1 and L2 compete for students, L2 will essentially
be forced to copy L1, so that L1’s price list offers students an
enormous amount of information about L2’s prices.  It follows
that if one or more schools choose to disclose prices, there will
be a transfer of wealth from the schools to the students.50  The
schools will have lost their bargaining advantage.  As a matter
of social welfare, however, there is a gain because students do
not need to engage in duplicative searching.
It is possible that some law schools, like L1, will neverthe-
less choose to be transparent and nudge the industry toward
more openness, and reduced search costs, without legal inter-
vention.  It might be motivated by a belief that it will be re-
warded by applicants who appreciate its first-mover and other-
49 The example in the text is most convincing when the schools are similarly
ranked and geographic neighbors, like New York University and Columbia for
instance, because it is easier to imagine that a price differential will cause stu-
dents who are admitted to both institutions to choose one or the other.  But even if
there is disparity in ranking and location, it is plausible that there is an across-
the-board price differential that causes a large number of students to switch from
one to the other.  Students who are admitted to Columbia and Penn, for instance,
might regularly choose the latter if there is a price discount of $x.  In that case, the
analysis in the text holds, and if either institution elects to be transparent, the
other will benefit at first, but then be more likely to choose transparency as well.
50 In the long run, the school may offer fewer amenities in which case there is
a transfer among students, but the discussion here refers to the apparent short-
run consequences.
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regarding decision.  It might observe information-sharing on
admitted student websites, and feel disadvantaged by non-
transparency, because some of the information about its own
pricing is false; the school, unlike random posters on a website,
will be subject to fraud claims if its disclosures are false.  A
reasonable conjecture, however, is that this has not yet oc-
curred because schools are reluctant to reveal pricing informa-
tion that is linked to gender or, especially, race.  If that is the
case, there will be extra resistance to the proposal advanced
here.  Voluntary disclosure is even less likely in the health-care
industry because hospitals enjoy some local market power;
fewer patients than law students will travel long distances for a
better price.
These examples of mandated transparency—assuming the
seller chooses to continue to negotiate prices rather than make
them uniform for all buyers in a given period—raise the obvi-
ous question of why yet one more disclosure requirement will
make any difference to real consumers, who are often bom-
barded with information in fonts and boxes of various sizes,
and are known to ignore most of what law forces sellers to
thrust in front of them.51  But there is no evidence or reason to
think that consumers ignore price information, or even knowl-
edge that prices are negotiable where they might have thought
otherwise.  Nor is there reason to think that the benefit of
transparency to some consumers, in the form of reduced
search costs, will harm others.
C. More Law and Less Bargaining in Business-to-
Consumer Transactions
The argument thus far is that there are markets in which
law ought to displace some bargaining freedom.  In particular,
negotiable prices raise search costs and inefficiently discourage
some buyers.  A uniformity-or-transparency rule ameliorates
these problems.  In some cases, transparency will work best in
conjunction with sound enforcement of antitrust law.  Markets
that already exhibit persistent failures and inefficiencies, such
as hospital services, may actually be improved competitively
with a transparency requirement—beyond a reduction in
search costs—if hospitals are competing on price in less con-
centrated markets.  It should be clear that transparent prices
51 See OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO
KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014); Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E.
Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 743 (2011)
(noting that “length, complexity, and difficulty” lead to unsuccessful mandates).
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will do little to rein in high costs if firms are not competing on
price.  Similarly, if transparency has the perverse effect of in-
creasing coordination among firms, it may reduce welfare and
require more rigorous enforcement of antitrust laws.52  Our
claim is that transparency, like uniformity, reduces search
costs and will enhance welfare in sufficiently competitive
markets.
Unfortunately, there is no magic way to sort industries or
firms in order to limit the uniformity-or-transparency proposal
to cases where it is certain to produce net benefits.  A case-by-
case determination could be delegated to the Federal Trade
Commission or another authority.  There is, however, the dan-
ger of inefficient rent-seeking behavior as industries try to es-
cape the requirement or force some firms into it.53  Moreover, a
transparency requirement brings on enforcement costs, and
these too must be weighed against the expected gain to con-
sumers who would otherwise search for information.  It is plau-
sible that the requirement should apply by default to all sellers
of goods and services, inasmuch as price disclosure saves
search costs and is unlikely to do harm.  Exceptions can be
made for sellers with low annual sales.  For example, the seller
at the neighborhood art fair and the occasional antique dealer
could size up customers and bargain accordingly; their goods
are, in any event, not easily categorized so that information
about past sales may not be worth the candle.  In a typical
shopping mall, where there is little haggling, the rule might
simply be that prices must be indicated on every item or shelf
(as already required in some jurisdictions54), and the seller
must post recent exceptions to these marked, uniform prices.
Thus, if a store does bargain over rug prices, then a notice
must be posted, and customers can view the history of recent
sales, or departures from posted prices.  The storekeeper might
52 Supra note 42.
53 Some industries might want law to impose transparency.  For example, a
large department store that sells rugs might be better off if independent rug
merchants lost their haggling and pricing advantages.
54 See, e.g., N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 20-708 (2016) (“All consumer
commodities, sold, exposed for sale or offered for sale at retail except those items
subject to section 20-708.1 of this code, shall have conspicuously displayed, at
the point of exposure or offering for sale, the total selling price exclusive of
tax . . . .”); Code of Massachusetts Regulations § 3.13 (1)(a) (2017) (“It is an unfair
and deceptive act . . . to fail to affix to any goods offered for sale to consumers
[without UPC codes] the price at which the goods are to be sold.”); New Jersey
Admin. Code § 13:45A-14.10(a) (2012) (“Whenever a regulated consumer com-
modity is exposed or offered for sale at retail, the unit price and retail price shall
be disclosed . . . .”); Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies § 21a-75-4 (2018)
(providing for unit price disclosure).
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insist that these past sales were of inferior goods, or categorize
the goods in a way that misleads consumers, but at least con-
sumers will have more information than at present.  Affirmative
misstatements by a seller will invite fraud claims.
Our intuition is that the uniformity-or-transparency re-
quirement should be limited to consumer transactions, includ-
ing, perhaps, some employment agreements.  If so, the
requirement would not apply to large law firms selling services
to corporate clients, to wholesalers selling appliances or food-
stuffs to stores in a shopping mall, or even to Facebook when it
sells advertising to businesses—though the discussion in sub-
part III.E suggests that there might be good reason for trans-
parency in that market inasmuch as price discrimination is
tolerated and even welcome.  There are several reasons for this
intuition about limiting transparency to consumer transac-
tions.  First, there is the danger that the disclosure of prices by
wholesalers and manufacturers, including the necessary cate-
gorization of goods and services, will raise rather than lower
prices, because it enables cartelization and price-fixing even as
it facilitates comparison shopping.  There is a good argument
that this is more likely where there are fewer sales for the cartel
to monitor.  Second, commercial (as opposed to consumer)
buyers are often repeat players and are better equipped to
search and negotiate.  Third, repeat buyers engaged in large
transactions are likely to develop or have access to low-cost
search strategies.  Finally, the discouraged-buyer problem is
surely more severe with consumers than businesses.  Consum-
ers might be scared away by the prospect of being out-haggled
by a professional seller, but commercial entities are less likely
to be chilled, and indeed may themselves be skilled bargainers
who prefer to do business where prices are negotiable, often
secret, and nonuniform.
D. Legal Services
In the law firm context, transparency would therefore be
limited to firms that deal with personal injury, divorce, and
other “consumer” transactions.  These firms would be required
to disclose the price term of past transactions to potential cli-
ents.  Price differentiation is allowed, meaning that different
products can come with disparate prices, but transparency is
then required.  A firm would need to disclose hourly rates, but
it must also disclose negotiated exceptions.  For example, a
firm might advertise that “contingency fees are 33%, but 50%
for cases that go to trial,” and then post recent exceptions to
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these prices.  It must not say to a potential client, “Well, how
much do you think a good divorce lawyer is worth?” unless the
consumer is handed a list, redacted where necessary, of recent
divorce clients and the fees they paid.  The suggested disclo-
sures are unlikely to run afoul of ethics rules, but if they do, it
is the rules that ought to be modified.
It is not unthinkable to extend the transparency require-
ment to law firms with business clients, inasmuch as these
buyers of legal services no doubt waste resources searching for
information about prices.  But the services at issue are rarely
identical to those sought by other buyers, so that comparative
price information alone is unlikely to do much about duplica-
tive search.  The same can be said about the hourly rates
charged by lawyers to business clients.  Buyers might like to
know whether the hourly rates quoted to them differ from those
charged to other clients, but that is only a small part of the
buying decision; it is hard to compare information about how
cases are staffed, how lawyers with different hourly rates are
assigned, and so forth.  Legal services for nonbusiness clients
such as will-drafting, residential conveyances, and no-fault di-
vorces exhibit greater homogeneity; even contingent-fee pric-
ing, when it varies, is susceptible to patterned regularity.  It is
where services themselves are duplicated across customers,
that there is significant opportunity to eliminate duplicative
search.55  In other cases, where no two purchases are alike,
price information may be valuable but the costs savings will be
less dramatic.
55 The division between fee-for-service versus hourly pricing is sharper in
Europe where civil law notaries often charge set fees for nonadversarial legal
services.  A transparency requirement may do more harm than good in this mar-
ket however, given that governments strictly control entry and notaries could
more easily coordinate pricing for services when fees are not regulated. See gener-
ally Pedro A. Malavet, Counsel for the Situation: The Latin Notary, A Historical and
Comparative Model, 19 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 389, 391 (1996) (noting that
in contrast to an attorney in the American adversarial system, a notary in the
European Latin notary system “acts as a nonadvocate” and “receives from the
State the exclusive authority to perform certain legal functions”); Paavo Monk-
konen, Are Civil-Law Notaries Rent-Seeking Monopolists or Essential Market In-
termediaries? Endogenous Development of a Property Rights Institution in Mexico,
43 J. PEASANT STUD. 1224 (2016), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC5467891/ [https://perma.cc/GM77-PYZL] (noting that “[n]otary fees are
usually regulated by the state government and fees are published in official news-
papers[,]” but research demonstrates that “these official prices [do] not correspond
to actual prices and notaries [are] able to charge more or less depending on their
reputation”).
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E. Employment Relations and Gender Disparities in
Earnings
A more difficult question is whether transparency ought to
be required in employment relationships, though these are not
conventionally categorized as consumer transactions.  The in-
dividual who takes a job at an auto dealership or hospital is in
the same position as the consumer who shops there; in both
settings, duplicative search can be avoided by a transparency
requirement.  In fact, employers often post uniform wage infor-
mation in order to attract appropriate job applicants.  When
there is room to bargain over wages, it is often because workers
bring different skills to the job, they earned disparate amounts
in prior jobs from which they are recruited, or the employer
needs an employee for a particular purpose or location.  In
short, consumer transactions more often involve identical
products, and a transparency requirement is therefore more
useful for consumer transactions than it would be for employ-
ment arrangements.  More important, in the post-bargaining
period, a consumer has little recourse if she discovers that
others paid lower prices.  She simply learns to search more the
next time.  In contrast, an employee who compares notes with
fellow workers and discovers that haggling might have been
worthwhile can always renegotiate or depart—or, what is worse
from the employer’s perspective, be resentful.  This is the flip
side of the observation that a consumer who fears price dis-
crimination can buy in the secondary market from another
consumer, while employment contracts cannot normally be
sold to another employee.  In any event, employers often com-
bat the resentment problem by making wages uniform, or even
transparent, without any legal nudge.
The more skilled the labor force, the more likely it is that
jobs and, therefore, wages are not comparable.  For instance,
the competencies of individual scientists who work for a private
laboratory or university faculty exhibit higher levels of variation
than those of workers in lower-skilled industries.  Transparent
wages reduce duplicative search only to the extent that workers
can be compared.
On the other hand, there is evidence that some part of the
male-female wage gap is attributable to the (disproportionate)
disinclination of women to negotiate compensation, to request
raises, and to ask to make more than co-workers.56  It is easy to
56 See Andreas Leibbrandt & John A. List, Do Women Avoid Salary Negotia-
tions? Evidence from a Large Scale Natural Field Experiment 1 (Nat’l Bureau of
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describe this as a problem of gender equality, but there is also
an efficiency element; the asymmetrically ill-informed individ-
ual is selling labor rather than buying a consumer good, so we
might label this a discouraged-seller problem.  Women who are
paid less than men, even if their productivity is equivalent or
greater, are more likely in the long run to exit the workforce,
avoid it altogether, or base their choice of industry, vocation, or
position on a tendency to avoid negotiation.57  Workers are
allocated, therefore, partly on their taste for haggling instead of
more fully on their productive output.  This is analogous to an
excise tax born by non-hagglers that may fall disproportion-
ately on women and, in any case, results in an inferior alloca-
tion of labor.  Over time, dynamic efficiencies generated by the
longer-term diversity benefits that accrue to society are lost.
The gender-disparity perspective encourages us to propose
that the uniformity-or-transparency rule be extended to em-
ployment relations, or perhaps simply to view individual hiring
and promotion decisions as consumer transactions.  Trans-
parency in this area is not a novel suggestion,58 and the
problems it poses are complex.  In smaller workplaces, like
many law faculties, transparency can surely create envy where
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18511, 2012). See generally LINDA BABCOCK &
SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON’T ASK: NEGOTIATION AND THE GENDER DIVIDE 20 (2003)
(citing research for the controversial, and perhaps overstated, view that “women
are much less likely than men to see the benefits and importance of asking for
what they want”).  For an interesting idea to combat the apparent inclination of
men but not women to ask for more than their peers are paid, see Adam M.
Samaha & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Don’t Ask, Must Tell—And Other Combinations,
103 CALIF. L. REV. 919, 985–86 (2015), which suggests that, at least where dis-
crimination has been found, women should be given more information than men.
57 The tendency may follow repeat observations of other women faring poorly
or being treated badly in negotiations.  For a controversial view, attributing female
distaste for haggling to a deficiency of female aggressiveness, see SHERYL
SANDBERG, LEAN IN: WOMEN, WORK, AND THE WILL TO LEAD 8 (2013).
58 See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace Trans-
parency, 63 STAN. L. REV. 351, 362, 369 (2011) (discussing workplace trans-
parency’s impact on contracts, compliance, reputation, employer costs, and
secrecy interests when workers and others look for information about price, pa-
rental leave, and a host of other workplace characteristics).  The idea that trans-
parency increases accountability and compresses wages has found some
empirical support in public-sector pay.  Following mandated transparency for
public sector wages in California, managerial wages fell by seven percent. See
Alexandre Mas, Does Transparency Lead to Pay Compression? 5 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20558, 2014).  When wage disparity is based
in part on legacy variables such as experience, an immediate change to trans-
parency may have smaller short-run effects. See Lydia Dishman, Why Salary
Transparency Didn’t Eliminate the Gender Wage Gap at this Startup, FAST COMPANY
(Mar. 31, 2016), https://www.fastcompany.com/3058447/why-salary-trans-
parency-didnt-eliminate-the-gender-wage-gap-at-this-start [https://perma.cc/
6LX6-FYWJ].
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there is presently a spirit of cooperation; uniformity puts more
stress on nonmonetary benefits, and makes it easier for com-
petitors to pick off stars.  And if high-end professional workers
are hard to compare, as already suggested, it might be enough
to disclose the gender gap, or take other steps to encourage
more bargaining, rather than less, by those previously disin-
clined to do so.59
F. Paying for Transparency
Transparency is socially valuable only if consumers can
and will use the information to reduce their search costs.  It is
often the case that required disclosures are too long or complex
for most consumers and, even when they are straightforward,
consumers often ignore them, perhaps relying on other, careful
shoppers to make markets work.  Fortunately, price informa-
tion is familiar, short, and simple, and likely to undergo rapid
and accurate cognitive processing.60  Moreover, there is market
evidence that buyers value the sort of information advanced by
our proposal.  For instance, many car buyers pay for Kelley
Blue Book information, and collectors of fine art pay for ap-
praisals or directly subscribe to databases that catalog past
auction prices.61  They would not pay for useless information.
It is interesting that sellers rarely offer past price informa-
tion for sale.  An alternative to the proposal advanced here
would be that, in the absence of uniform prices, sellers must
offer transparency, but can demand payment for it.  Unfortu-
nately, markets for information are difficult to sustain because
it is easy for a buyer to share the information with others.62
59 For example, uniformity-or-transparency might be required for associates
in a law firm but not partners, inasmuch as the latter are harder to compare
because they come with different books of business, experience, and specialties.
Similarly, senior faculty might be different from their junior colleagues—except
that this distinction is likely to leave untouched the pay disparity issue.
60 See LARRY SAMUELSON, EVOLUTIONARY GAMES AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 24
(1997) (noting that learning occurs at higher levels in “strategic situation[s] that
[are] frequently encountered and sufficiently simple and important to command
attention”). See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011) (not-
ing that attentiveness varies with information complexity).
61 See Past Auctions: Results, Sales, Price Realized, CHRISTIE’S, http://www.
christies.com/results/ [https://perma.cc/GXC9-P6X6] (last visited Feb. 18,
2018); Search Auction Price Results, LIVEAUCTIONEERS, https://www.liveauction
eers.com/auction_results.html [https://perma.cc/BS73-UVZM] (last visited Feb.
18, 2018) (aggregating multiple auction houses’ results).
62 Information can be something of a public good, exhibiting nonexcludability
as well as nonrivalry.  As such it is likely to be under-produced in a free market.
On the other hand, product differentiation can be used to extract information
about the marginal benefit users receive. See Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and
Public Good Economics: A Misunderstood Relation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 638
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Kelley Blue Book is the exception rather than the rule, in part
because it, or more technically its competitor, has been deemed
to select and arrange (mere) data about cars in a manner suffi-
ciently original to earn copyright protection.63
If sellers must be transparent, and cannot or may not sell
this transparency, they may react by differentiating products,
as discussed above.64  They may do this to facilitate price dis-
crimination and they may do it to obscure the price information
inasmuch as it will then more often be the case that a con-
sumer wants a product for which there is no precise, prior sale
price information.  Still, common sense suggests that while
such a seller may make price information less useful, trans-
parency will reduce search costs.
G. Transparency, Disclosure Rules, and the End of
Haggling
The idea of requiring uniformity or transparency for most
consumer transactions is meant to bring an end to most hag-
gling.  It is a radical proposal, given the long history of that
selling process.  But transparency is of a piece with labeling
requirements, consumer finance regulations, and other legal
innovations that have found their place in law over many years,
and can be understood as economizing on search costs.65  In
most cases, law imposes obligations on the seller, who is best
situated to develop and report information in a nonduplicative
manner, and often able to pass on the cost of an information
requirement.66
(2007); see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS
IN A CONNECTED WORLD 120 (2001) (noting that digitized information can be copied
perfectly without cost).
63 CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 67
(2d Cir. 1994).  The case involved data taken from The Red Book, Kelley’s less well-
known competitor.
64 See subpart II.B.
65 See 79 Fed. Reg. 71156, Food Labeling; Nutrition Labeling of Standard
Menu Items in Restaurants and Similar Retail Food Establishments (providing
information on caloric content of food to decrease risk of obesity); see also 66 Fed.
Reg. 1750, Retained Water in Raw Meat and Poultry Products; Poultry Chilling
Requirements (providing rules to promote both safety and informed purchasing
decisions); 49 C.F.R. 571.208, Occupant Crash Protection (providing the same);
Saul Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of Contracts, 68
VA. L. REV. 117, 140 (1982) (demonstrating law’s intervention where search costs
can be reduced); eRegulations, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, https://www.
consumerfinance.gov/eregulations/1026 [https://perma.cc/MEC3-ARY7] (last
visited Feb. 18, 2018) (summarizing and referencing disclosure rules with respect
to home mortgages, auto loans, student loans, and credit cards).
66 Thus, the seller of a used automobile may know of some serious structural
weakness caused by a collision, deftly but not completely repaired.  The buyer can
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In some cases, the most efficient provider of information is
the buyer.  Thus, the doctrine of utmost good faith in insurance
law generally requires that the insured must disclose every-
thing material to a reasonable insurer, and here it is the in-
sured—the buyer of insurance—who has better information
and can economize on overall search costs.  While courts gen-
erally do not apply “utmost” good faith to ordinary insurance
relationships, they consistently apply it in the context of rein-
surance.67 The rationale is that reinsurers who are asked to
cover catastrophic risks must be able to rely on the insured’s
utmost good faith to avoid duplicating the costly underwriting
and administrative work of the initial insurer.68  That ordinary
insurers only receive basic good-faith protection generates in-
centives for exerting efficient underwriting effort during the
creation of the initial policy.  Enhanced good-faith protection
for reinsurers plainly takes aim at duplicative search costs.  In
contrast, the unwillingness to apply the doctrine against the
typical insured reflects a (sometimes perverse) consumer pro-
insist on a test-drive, and pay a mechanic to inspect the car, but each step adds to
the buyer’s transaction costs.  These expenditures will not be reimbursed if the
buyer decides not to buy the car.  But the seller might offer a limited warranty or
show the buyer evidence of a mechanic’s inspection to encourage purchase, and
presumably collect a slightly higher price for the vehicle in the process.  It is
interesting to imagine a buyer who asks questions of the seller before gathering
information about the vehicle, and then sues for her inspection costs if the seller’s
disclosures are found to be incomplete or misleading.  The buyer can ask whether
the car uses a good deal of oil, for example, and then if a mechanic’s inspection
reveals a leak, and the buyer declines to purchase the vehicle, the buyer could sue
the seller for the amount paid to the mechanic and for the buyer’s time.  But law is
unlikely to allow this claim both because the seller’s mis-disclosure and the
mechanic’s report will often be less than clear-cut and because the buyer’s time is
difficult to value.  The buyer could ask the seller upfront to agree to this sort of
reimbursement, but the seller is unlikely to agree, and for the same reasons.
Even in the case of home inspections, sellers will not agree or be made to pay for
the buyer’s home inspection costs when the inspection reveals a flaw known to the
seller.
67 Compagnie De Reassurance D’Ile de Fr. v. New Eng. Reinsurance Corp., 57
F.3d 56, 72–73 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that reinsured owes reinsurer utmost good
faith in its representations); Compagnie De Reassurance D’Ile de Fr. v. New Eng.
Reinsurance Corp., 944 F. Supp. 986, 992–94 (D. Mass. 1996) (documenting the
history of the rule requiring standard good-faith representations from the ordi-
nary insured and utmost good-faith representations from the reinsured); Christia-
nia Gen. Ins. Corp. of N.Y. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 979 F.2d 268, 278 (2d Cir. 1992)
(holding that reinsured owes reinsurer “utmost good faith, requiring the reinsured
to disclose to the reinsurer all facts that materially affect the risk of which it is
aware and of which the reinsurer itself has no reason to be aware”).
68 Indemnity doctrine and factual warranties further suppress moral hazard.
The former limits recovery to the value of the goods lost.  The latter, if breached,
release the insurer from any obligation to cover losses.
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tection mindset.69 The idea may be that amateurs will some-
times fail to disclose because of mistake or forgetfulness, and
law will have trouble distinguishing between mere oversight
and bad-faith nondisclosure.  These examples point to the
emergence of rules that minimize information-gathering costs,
and that is precisely what transparency and uniformity en-
courage.  Haggling should continue on its path to
obsolescence.
In principle, price information might be forthcoming with-
out any new legal rules.  A buyer can ask about price just as
she can ask about quality.  For example, if the seller of a used
vehicle does not offer a warranty or full information about a
vehicle’s history, the buyer can ask specific questions, includ-
ing: “Has this vehicle had any major repairs?”  The seller can-
not lie.  If the seller is silent, the buyer is likely to infer the
worst.  Similarly, a buyer who faces nonuniform prices when
shopping for a new vehicle could ask for a list of prices at which
comparable vehicles were sold over the previous month.  In
turn, just as law has come to save buyers this step with regard
to some product characteristics, so that the seller must dis-
close rather than be silent or hope that a key question goes
unasked, it could do so with respect to price negotiability and
history.70  Much as the law has come to require homeowners to
disclose the presence of termites, and to apply the doctrine of
69 Cf. Jay M. Feinman, The Law of Insurance Claim Practices: Beyond Bad
Faith, 47 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 693, 709 n.86 (2012) (noting that “[l]arge
entities that negotiate terms of policies on a relatively equal footing with insurers
are protected by the same good-faith principles, but the nature of their relation
with the company is substantially different, so the application of those principles
is different”).
70 Famously, there are some things sellers must disclose even if not asked,
and silence is no defense.  Thus, sellers of houses must disclose termites and
poisoned water wells. See Janinda v. Lanning, 390 P.2d 826, 829–30 (Idaho
1964) (contaminated wells); Obde v. Schlemeyer, 353 P.2d 672, 674 (Wash. 1960)
(termites).  In both cases there is a net social loss if the problems go unrepaired.
Price information may not seem to fit the category, but past prices are analogous,
if the category is described as information many buyers will duplicatively seek.
Consider, for example, the seller of a car who knows of a weakened chassis or tire,
as opposed to one who knows that his car has simply rusted more than average.
A reasonable position is that the chassis and tire are like termites, but the rust is
not.  A reasonable seller, or owner, will not necessarily repair or decline to drive a
rusty vehicle.  A weakened chassis or tire needs immediate tending, and it is
therefore socially efficient to give the buyer this information.  As a matter of law,
the Federal Trade Commission’s Used Car Rule is not terribly helpful.  Among
other things, it calls for disclosure regarding “the major mechanical and electrical
systems on the car, as well as some of the major problems that consumers should
look out for.” Dealer’s Guide to the Used Car Rule, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/dealers-guide-used-
car-rule [https://perma.cc/X2PJ-F8Z5].
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utmost good faith to reinsurers, it could and should economize
on duplicative search costs, and solve the problem of discour-
aged buyers, by requiring uniformity or transparency about
prices and past prices.  If the transparency requirement is on-
erous, it may bring about the end of haggling, which is almost
surely a desirable outcome.
III
PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN THE SHADOW OF A UNIFORMITY-
OR-TRANSPARENCY REQUIREMENT
A. Introduction: Desirable Price Discrimination
It is apparent that the uniformity-or-transparency require-
ment makes price discrimination by sellers more difficult.  Uni-
formity on its own is normally inconsistent with price
discrimination; the former requires that all buyers face the
same prices, at least in a given time period, while the latter
aims to charge different prices to buyers with different elastici-
ties of demand in order to extract greater revenue from them.
Price discrimination can survive only if the seller can separate
these buyers by time or product differentiation.  Thus, if a new
iPhone is introduced at a very high price, and then its price is
reduced for all consumers two months later, the seller has
provided uniform prices—and little search is required of con-
sumers—but successfully discriminated between those very
eager to be among the first to have the new phone and those
who simply prefer the phone to their present one.  Similarly, a
gold Apple Watch, offered at a very high premium, may succeed
in gaining revenue from buyers who will pay far more for exclu-
sivity than the marginal cost of producing the item.  But in
most cases, price discrimination is synonymous with non-
uniform prices, and its success requires that consumers be
ignorant of the lower prices available elsewhere for the same
good.  Arbitrage must also be difficult; price discrimination is
defeated when someone can buy the good at the low price and
then find and resell to the consumers willing to pay more.
A seller price discriminates in order to increase profits, but
there are situations in which this discrimination is regarded as
desirable rather than as simply redistributing wealth from buy-
ers to a seller.  First, where a monopoly is inevitable, price
discrimination can reduce or eliminate the inefficiency, or
deadweight loss, that normally accompanies monopoly pricing.
Second, and often overlapping, there are industries with high
fixed costs and low marginal costs, where price discrimination
may be the best way to sustain a firm.  If the firm produces
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essential goods, such as clean water in a rural area, a new drug
that can cure an epidemic, or even phone service, it is espe-
cially important that some price discrimination be possible,
unless the government is able to subsidize the good or provide
it as a public project.  In this Part, we begin with the economics
of price discrimination and then show that where there is desir-
able discrimination, it can often survive a uniformity-or-trans-
parency requirement.  In the few cases where it cannot, we
suggest that the requirement be relaxed.  These cases are fairly
easy to identify.
B. The Basic Economics
In a perfectly competitive market, a buyer who values a
good above its marginal cost is normally able to acquire it at the
market price as determined by the intersection of supply and
demand.  An inframarginal buyer gains consumer surplus, be-
cause she would have paid more for the good, but is able to
acquire it at the prevailing price.  A seller that tries to raise the
price in order to extract this buyer’s surplus will lose the sale to
a competitor.  However, where competition is imperfect, and
certainly where a monopolist operates in a market, the seller is
likely to price above marginal cost and extract some of this
consumer surplus while earning monopoly profits.  The equi-
librium price will be above marginal cost.  In these settings,
economists often favor legal intervention to eliminate the mo-
nopoly, but, where that is difficult, a very different approach is
to eliminate the inefficiency by allowing the monopolist to price
discriminate among consumers.  If the monopolist can engage
in (what is sometimes called first-degree) perfect price discrimi-
nation, then it can charge each buyer the price that buyer is
willing to pay.  The discriminating seller must be able to iden-
tify the high-valuing buyers and then prevent arbitrage among
buyers.  The more complete the price discrimination, the less
the deadweight loss.  In the extreme, the outcome is as socially
efficient as perfect competition, though there is redistribution
from the buyers to the seller.
For example, imagine that consumers A, B, C, and D would
pay $10, $7, $6, and $1, respectively, for a good that only M is
licensed to sell.  M’s cost of producing one unit of the good is
$1, but a second unit can be produced for $2, a third unit for
$5, and a fourth unit for $9, as the resources needed for pro-
duction are scarce.  It is efficient to provide the good to all the
customers but D; only D values the good at less than its margi-
nal cost of production.  With competition, the market would
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clear at a price of $6, the third consumer C’s willingness to pay.
Note that there will be profit of $18 – $8 = $10, but a fourth unit
of production would cost $9 and only be valued at $1 by D.  If
M’s license gives it a monopoly, and it need not fear new en-
trants, then M will want to produce two units rather than
three.  It will sell to A and B at $7, and this revenue of $14 will
be reduced by the cost of $1 + $2, for a profit of $11.  This is
nothing more than an example of the monopolist’s setting mar-
ginal revenue equal to marginal cost, and reducing output.  The
monopolist prefers not to sell to C, because lowering the price
to $6 sacrifices further the revenue obtained from A and B.  But
what if M can price discriminate, and prevent arbitrage, so that
it is impossible for any buyer, like C, to buy at $6 and resell to
A?  In that case, M is happy to sell to C at $6 (because M’s
marginal cost for a third unit is $5), if M can still charge $7 to A
and B.  It is even better for M if it can sell to A at $10, B at $7,
and then C at $6.  This is perfect price discrimination and it
produces revenue of $23 with a cost of production of $8, for a
profit of $15.  Moreover, every buyer willing to pay more than
marginal cost is satisfied.  There is something of a wealth
transfer from A and B to M, but no deadweight loss.
Price discrimination is possible whether marginal costs are
increasing, constant, or decreasing.71  Decreasing marginal
costs imply the presence of ever-increasing economies of scale,
which is tenable only if production factors are perfectly adapta-
ble.  The textbook example is the utility provider.  Once a power
grid or a cellular network has been built, production factors do
not require further change to service additional clients.72  Price
discrimination is generally favored in these cases as a self-
contained method of ensuring that service is widely available
and no new, distortionary taxes are needed to keep the utility
afloat.  In these situations, if law allows or encourages a price-
discriminating monopoly, law usually regulates prices in order
to ensure broad distribution as well as some limit on the mo-
nopolist’s extraction.  The monopolist cannot raise prices or
refine its discriminatory pricing schedule without the approval
of the regulator.  An alternative is to auction the monopoly
right, with the government paying the low-cost provider.73  But
this requires necessarily distortionary taxes, or pricing above
marginal cost.  Low and even zero marginal cost situations are
71 PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 8, at 410.
72 In most cases, administration costs can be considered negligible.
73 For example, Congress has granted the FCC authority to auction mutually
exclusive licenses. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j) (2012).
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increasingly common, in large part because of the digital econ-
omy.  As we will see, law may already reflect the idea that
transparent or uniform pricing offers a way of economizing on
information-gathering costs in such markets.74
The preceding example illustrates how price discrimination
can generate allocative efficiency, and be preferable to a con-
ventional monopolist with uniform pricing, but an overlooked
problem is that it can also engender wasteful rent-seeking.  In
many cases, monopoly power, necessary for price discrimina-
tion, is made possible because of barriers to entry established
by law.  There are, for example, serious legal hurdles that pro-
spective airlines, electric utilities, hospitals, and law schools
face.  A monopolist will often facilitate its price discrimination
strategy by keeping out competitors, and to do so it will call on
lawmakers to erect or maintain barriers to entry.  The re-
sources spent on influencing law can be thought of as rent-
seeking costs, and these are often wasteful.75  Moreover, suc-
cessful rent-seeking often petrifies market structures and
stifles innovation.  Producers who enjoy full profits from cap-
turing surpluses are encouraged to seek regulatory approval
and may have little incentive to reduce marginal costs through
technological improvement.76  For these reasons, efficiency
achieved through price discrimination is inferior to the same
achieved through perfect competition.
In sum, discriminatory pricing can be attractive, even if it
is a second-best solution, inasmuch as it achieves efficiency
and rewards investment in capital-intensive industries that re-
quire high up-front investments.77  It is apparent that
lawmakers must carefully consider the advantages and costs of
74 This approach becomes less attractive as a market’s cost structure reflects
constant or increasing costs.  For instance, airlines are characterized by high
fixed costs but then by substantial and even increasing marginal costs, as pas-
senger counts increase.  More precisely, marginal costs can be characterized by a
series of decreasing U-shaped cost curves followed by a series of increasing U-
shaped cost curves.  As these costs increase, fewer passengers are willing to pay
the marginal cost of transport.  In this setting, price discrimination is less valua-
ble because airlines are unable to satisfy customers cost-effectively.  When air-
lines sell first-class seats at prices much higher than coach or even business-
class seats, they are engaging in third-degree price discrimination.  But when we
see comparable and even adjacent airline seats sold at different prices, we are
probably observing an airline using prices to clear a market or fill a flight.
75 See PHILIP P. FRICKEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 15 (1991).
76 W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 570 (4th ed.
2005).
77 J. Bradford Delong & Lawrence H. Summers, The ‘New Economy’: Back-
ground, Historical Perspective, Questions, and Speculations, FED. RES. BANK KAN.
CITY ECON. REV., Fourth Quarter 2001, at 29, 50.
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price discrimination.  There are alternative means of providing
incentives to firms in industries with zero or declining marginal
costs.78  Most important, price discrimination is unnecessary
where marginal-cost pricing will sustain a firm.  There is noth-
ing efficient about a rug merchant or car dealer engaging in
price discrimination.  On the other hand, the social value of
serving a broad consumer base, rather than allowing the mo-
nopolist to restrict output, is easily seen with necessities such
as life-saving medicines, vaccines, and clean water.  These
goods tend to be produced with high initial costs but then very
low marginal costs.  If all consumers are served with low, mar-
ginal-cost pricing, the seller might lose money and be unable to
recoup those initial costs.  Discriminatory pricing can thus en-
able greater output and access, so long as even low-income
consumers are willing (and able) to pay a price at least equal to
marginal cost.  Ideally, other consumers will pay enough above
marginal cost to finance the seller’s fixed costs.79  Note, again,
that desirable price discrimination is not possible in the face of
arbitrage.  It is easy to see how arbitrage, or resale, is prevented
for HIV treatments.  In other markets, sellers might need help
from the legal authorities.  In any event, the larger point is that
inasmuch as the seller needs to haggle—without trans-
parency—in order to obtain desirable price discrimination, it
risks creating a set of discouraged buyers and attendant ineffi-
ciency.80  Thus, haggling may be necessary for desirable price
discrimination, so that an ironclad uniformity-or-transparency
78 Price and entry regulation can force marginal-cost pricing and achieve
allocative efficiency while allowing a firm to recoup an investment over time
through temporary entry restrictions. VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 76, at 560–61.  In
some settings, depressed innovation can be addressed with regulatory lags that
allow firms to retain cost savings from new technology until the regulator adjusts
the price.  George Sweeney, Adoption of Cost-Saving Innovations by a Regulated
Firm, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 437, 437 (1981).
79 The benefits of allocative efficiency are greater in some markets than in
others.  Thus, law might be more supportive of price discrimination to finance HIV
treatments than to sustain a blockbuster Broadway show.  The aggregate benefits
are greater in the former case, and especially so when intensity or utility is judged
in a manner that controls for income, or ability to pay.
80 Returning to the discussion in subpart I.C. and the insight that economists
as well as lawyers have failed to notice discouraged buyers and the social cost of
haggling, it is apparent that if there are very few discouraged buyers and the
uniformity-or-transparency rule proposed here leads to uniformity (no price dis-
crimination) or higher prices that discourage even more buyers, then haggling is
superior to no-haggling.  Conversely, if prices are already high under haggling
because a monopolist is at work, then a switch to transparency will not drive
down prices, but it will bring the non-haggling discouraged buyers to the market.
The point in the text is that the first scenario seems unlikely, especially where
antitrust law or public utility regulation can be counted on to control monopolies.
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rule is ill-advised, but because haggling brings on the ineffi-
ciency associated with discouraged buyers, the number of mar-
kets where price discrimination is desirable is smaller than
conventionally thought.
C. Price Discrimination and Transparency
Price discrimination can be inconsistent with trans-
parency.  This is because better information often allows a con-
sumer who attaches a high value to a good to mimic a low-
valuing consumer.  Imagine, for example, that A and B are
wealthier consumers, who are therefore willing to pay more for
M’s good, and M is able to identify such buyers and discrimi-
nate by announcing a higher price to buyers from certain zip
codes, where property values are high.  With transparency,
these buyers will know to shop elsewhere, to misstate their zip
codes, or to make their purchases through intermediaries lo-
cated in less rarified zip codes.81
In other settings, transparency does not preclude price dis-
crimination.  A public utility might discriminate, charging large
commercial customers lower prices than other customers;
these customers exhibit greater elasticity of demand because
they can more easily set up their own generators.  There is not
much residential customers can do but pay the higher prices
they are charged, and it is impossible for them to buy electricity
from the commercial customers without detection by the
utility.
D. Occasional Purchasers and Innovation
It is apparent that in a few markets price discrimination is
a useful means of covering fixed costs, and because innovation
often requires an upfront investment, it too can be promoted by
price discrimination.  It follows that a uniformity-or-trans-
parency requirement might generate social losses that out-
weigh the benefits of eliminating duplicative search and
discouraged buyers.  The prototypical case is where a firm
would be unprofitable with uniform pricing, but would manage
to cover its high fixed costs if it could extract consumer surplus
81 Economists generally favor price discrimination because it encourages al-
locative efficiency in less than perfect markets, as illustrated in the text.  Consum-
ers’ willingness to pay for a particular good or service varies, by preferences as
well as wealth.  By permitting producers to charge dissimilar prices, more con-
sumers can be served.  Law might prohibit price discrimination and then tax
those willing to subsidize the unwilling, but it is more often the case that some
amount of discrimination is allowed since taxes are imperfect and generate
distortions.
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through price discrimination.  There is good reason to enable
this strategy where experience and innovation are likely to
bring down costs in the future.  Consider, for example, the
market for commercial satellite launch services.  This is hardly
a market replete with consumer transactions, but it is instruc-
tive to see why transparency might be ill-advised even if our
proposal were extended beyond business-to-consumer trans-
actions.  Moreover, while the buyers of satellite services are
sophisticated businesses, most are not repeat players and thus
bear some resemblance to everyday consumers.  In this mar-
ket, transparency would surely reduce search costs, as launch
prices per ton range widely, from $11 million to $35 million;
buyers have good reason to discover what others are paying,
and then to hold out and try to be the marginal, low-price
customer.82  Nontransparency, and perhaps clever auctions,
help the seller identify and extract revenue from buyers with
high willingness to pay.  These buyers are unlikely to be dis-
couraged by the process, which can be thought of as a form of
haggling.  Ideally, nondisclosure and attendant price discrimi-
nation allow the firm to survive and, eventually, to innovate
and reduce costs.  The same argument can be made about the
production of satellites themselves, where there are also high
fixed costs, room to innovate, and buyers with wildly different
reservation prices.
In this and other industries where high initial investments
are required, and where marginal cost is zero or constantly low,
price discrimination or some form of government subsidy (or
regulated price) may be essential for recouping fixed invest-
ments and efficiently scaling production.  This is one rationale
for intellectual property law, which rewards innovators with
temporary monopolies.  It is also what motivates public utility
rate regulation.  If transparency should make the high-valuing
buyers less willing to pay higher prices than other buyers, law
must allow nontransparency or be prepared to subsidize firms
in the industry.  Inasmuch as subsidies come with their own
inefficiencies, both in terms of rent-seeking and distortionary
taxes, there is good reason to favor price discrimination.83  It is
for this reason that we try to leave untouched cases where price
discrimination is desirable; a requirement of transparency can
easily reduce a seller’s ability to price discriminate.
82 Rich Smith, How Much Does It Cost to Launch a Satellite?, MOTLEY FOOL
(June 24, 2016, 11:41 AM), https://www.fool.com/investing/2016/06/24/how-
much-does-it-cost-to-launch-a-satellite.aspx [https://perma.cc/AT67-74DZ].
83 PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 8, at 410.
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As a practical matter, transparency does not destroy a reg-
ulated utility’s ability to price discriminate.  Consumers gener-
ally find it impossible to arbitrage such things as electric power
and water; here the monopolist’s ability to extract enough sur-
plus to earn a fair rate of return does not even require a rule of
nontransferability.  If airlines do present a case where price
discrimination is critical for efficiency, then it is noteworthy
that we can have both transparency as well as successful price
discrimination—because the legal system is willing to enforce
the airline’s rule against transferring tickets to another buyer.
There is no first-sale doctrine, or alienability norm, that allows
consumers to resell tickets they cannot use, and certainly not
to buy low and sell at a medium price to fellow passengers who
are at the high end of the demand curve and subject to ex-
ploitation by the airline.  Thus, if the airline sells seats to chil-
dren at a low price, likely because they or their families are
sensitive to price, these children and their families cannot buy
tickets and resell them to solo business travelers because air-
lines or government authorities check that the passenger’s
identification matches the name on the ticket.84
Unsurprisingly, the launch services industry is routinely
subsidized.85  Products or services that exhibit high fixed cost
investment and large outlays for innovation compete for capital
with other industries that usually exhibit more favorable char-
acteristics for investors.  Thus, project finance industries, es-
pecially characterized by natural monopoly, will seek
nondisclosure in order to facilitate cost recovery through price
discrimination.86  An exception is sport venues.  The construc-
tion of a stadium requires a substantial fixed cost investment,
but disclosure of the price history of ticket sales will do little to
lower prices and reduce long-run efficiency in stadium build-
ing.  Although concert-goers can travel short distances to see
similar performances, the stadium maintains local market
power, especially over a local team’s fan base.  The teams and
stadiums do reasonably well with box seats and other means of
price discrimination, in part because high-valuing buyers
84 There are surely other ways to monitor safety.
85 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-322 and 58.1-402 (2009) (providing for no
taxation on profits made from launching individuals or payloads into space);
Regional Spaceport District Act, codified at N.M. STAT. §§ 5-16-1–5-16-13 (2008)
(creating a statutory source of funding for spaceport development in New Mexico);
Pub. L. No. 108-428 (2004) (providing federal indemnification for third-party
claims between $500 million and $2 billion against commercial launchers).
86 Most natural monopolies are already subject to price and entry regulation,
designed to allow them to recover costs. See VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 76, at
555–56.
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strongly prefer box seats over the bleachers.  Still, because this
price discrimination does not easily extend to fans who watch
on television, upfront subsidies are needed—even if the sta-
dium is a good social investment.87
E. Facebook and Other Zero-Marginal-Cost Cases
Nonuniform, nontransparent pricing is common in the
contemporary world of online advertising.  Facebook, Google,
and other important platforms, or sellers, are fueled by adver-
tising revenue, while the advertisers (as well as users, or con-
sumers) are unaware of the prices charged to others, and
ignorant of the algorithms used by their seller.  In practice,
Facebook auctions off advertising spots.  Buyers pay according
to the traffic or “link-clicks,” and follow-through activity they
obtain, but Facebook determines the winner of each auction,
based on its estimation of revenue.  Facebook encourages ad-
vertisers to bid their true reservation prices by promising a
kind of second-price auction; buyers bid per click (or thousand
impressions) and Facebook promises that the click price will be
the maximum necessary to buy the spot, which is roughly the
bid by the second-highest bidder.88  Inasmuch as Facebook
retains control over the transaction, bidders have reason to
acquire information, and there is room to reduce costs; buyers
would benefit from knowing how much others are likely to bid
and also from discovering or approximating Facebook’s al-
gorithm for choosing among bids.  If there is evidence that ad-
vertisers indeed work to discover and compare prices bid and
paid by others, then the uniformity-or-transparency proposal
advanced here might be extended beyond consumer transac-
tions so that Facebook would be required to disclose the prices
paid by comparable advertisers in order to limit this inefficient
search.
Another disclaimer concerns the importance of law not in-
terfering with desirable innovation.  It may, for example, be
efficient for Facebook’s own algorithm to be transparent, except
that this gives information to Facebook’s competitors and thus
may interfere with the incentive to innovate in this evolving
87 A matter that is much debated. See Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist,
Build the Stadium, Create Jobs, in SPORTS, JOBS, AND TAXES: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT
OF SPORTS TEAMS AND STADIUMS 1, 25 (Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist eds., 2011)
(noting that subsidies outweigh financial benefits and that city governments sup-
port stadium construction because of its intense popularity among voters).
88 How Ad Billing Works on Facebook, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.
com/business/help/614797551881954 [https://perma.cc/T8ST-6Q24] (last vis-
ited Feb. 18, 2018).
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industry.89  Again, note that our focus is on Facebook’s sales to
advertisers rather than its sales to, or extractions from, individ-
ual consumers, or Facebook friends, because at present the
former but not the latter are likely to be wasting resources in
duplicative searches.
The immediate question is whether Facebook’s (and other
platforms’) nontransparent pricing is part of a desirable price-
discrimination scheme that is well worth the cost of some du-
plicative searching by advertisers.  If the price discrimination
simply reflects a means of metering usage, then buyers have no
reason to search, and indeed pricing may as well be transpar-
ent if not uniform.  It would not be efficient to require uniform
pricing—in this case for Facebook to announce the per click
price for a given placement—because buyers place different
value on particular spots, and Facebook has a limited number
of such spots.  It may also be unwise to require a strict second
price auction.  One advertiser may be indifferent between ad-
vertising on two sports news feeds, while another may only
want to pay for an ad near a segment about a Chicago sports
team.  On such matters, the advertiser has more information
than Facebook, and so the latter extracts the information with
an auction.  In some media, a uniform price per viewer (or click
equivalent) is good enough.  For example, a television network
charges according to expected viewership, with a premium for
viewers that are otherwise hard to reach.  A minute during the
Super Bowl is famously expensive, and the first minute before
kickoff is more expensive than one in the middle of the third
quarter.  These differences are allocatively efficient in the sense
of assigning the highest-valued time to the party willing to pay
the most.  The marginal cost of producing the extra viewers is
close to zero.  In this setting, price discrimination is efficient,
though it is probably better understood as product differentia-
tion, with the better products going to those willing to pay more
for them.  In both cases, transparency hurts no one; Facebook
and the Super Bowl network have nothing to fear from arbi-
trage so long as they extract high payments for the most desira-
ble spots.  In the Facebook case, there may be
89 For instance, Facebook has recently developed automated messaging “chat
bots” to interact with its users and mine additional data to enhance the precision
of its algorithmic advertising.  Madhumita Murgia, Facebook Messenger’s New
Bots Are a Powerful Way to Target Adverts, TELEGRAPH (Apr. 13, 2016, 2:46 PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2016/04/12/facebook-messenger-
launches-chat-bot-economy-to-take-on-apps/ [https://perma.cc/B69C-KPU3].
If competitors could simply use the algorithm, then Facebook might have less
incentive to develop and strengthen its capabilities.
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nontransparency both with respect to the prices paid by other
advertisers and with respect to some of the characteristics of
the viewing audience that Facebook discovers but does not
entirely share.  Given Facebook’s ability to price discriminate
with transparent pricing, by segmenting its user base, it would
be surprising if our proposal (even if applied to these noncon-
sumer transactions) destroyed its business model.  Facebook
can segment end-users by offering advertisers different prices
based on demographic characteristics of the audience.  It can
also segment the advertisers, charging prices that take into
account the alternative media available to disparate
advertisers.
Moreover, Facebook has other ways to extract revenue in
the event of a requirement of transparency, or even of uniform
pricing.  It might offer uniform prices, but charge for market
research.  The more an advertiser wants to know about the
audience, the higher the cost.  More important, however, is the
observation that legal intervention—and not just of the kind
proposed here—might push Facebook into an altogether differ-
ent business model.  It could join Netflix and cable television in
adopting a subscription model, with little or no advertising.
The subscriptions could themselves involve some metering, or
low-level price discrimination, even if there were a trans-
parency or uniformity requirement.  At present, Facebook hesi-
tates to charge users directly because of the fear that users—
its major business asset—will migrate in large numbers to an-
other platform, much as Facebook once benefited when users
of Myspace left that market-leading competitor.90  If, however,
users perceived that law rather than corporate greed pushed
Facebook from an advertising to a subscription model, they
might not jump ship, especially if offered a choice between the
status quo, with some extraction of information, and a monthly
fee to be free of most or all advertising.  Note that a subscrip-
tion model would hardly reflect marginal-cost pricing.  Indeed,
from an efficiency perspective, the current business model is
more attractive than the subscription alternative.  While there
90 We set aside the popular, or populist, idea that Facebook should pay users,
depending on the value of information extracted from them.  The idea must be
motivated by a sense that many users would provide more useful information if
they were paid. See JARON LANIER, WHO OWNS THE FUTURE? 1–2 (2013).  On Mys-
pace, see Matthew Garrahan, The Rise and Fall of Myspace, FINANCIAL TIMES: FT
MAGAZINE (Dec. 4, 2009).  Note that the information problems discussed here cast
doubt on the market’s ability to pay the right price for user-supplied information.
Facebook and Google know what the information is worth, while individuals do
not; neither transparency nor uniformity will fix this problem.
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is no production cost associated with the marginal advertiser,
prices—and even auctions—are suitable means of allocating
the scarce resource of screen space (that typical users will tol-
erate and to which they will best respond).  In this respect,
Netflix seems more inefficient than Facebook.91
In short, if there is an inefficiency associated with
Facebook and other online providers, it is the duplicative
searching that advertisers undertake as they bargain for better
advertising rates.  It appears that Facebook could provide
enough information to make such searching unnecessary, and
that it could do so without destroying its business model.  If a
transparency requirement did nudge Facebook to a subscrip-
tion model, it is plausible that this would be especially desira-
ble—though surely unpopular with Facebook users—but this
conclusion depends on the volume of duplicative searching
that advertisers engage in at present, as they try to bid strategi-
cally in the face of Facebook’s hidden auction algorithm.
F. Compulsory Licenses in Copyright Law
The idea that zero-marginal-cost producers could be fi-
nanced with subscription fees that are uniform or transpar-
ent—with or without a price-discrimination feature—is
something rarely seen in the regulation of public utilities, but it
does offer a novel way of thinking about and evaluating impor-
tant parts of copyright law.  There was a time when regulated
water companies charged a flat fee per household; over time,
water conservation brought on metering.92  Electric utilities
might also have suggested and been allowed to use uniform
subscription rates for household service, but with no incentive
to conserve, utilities would have needed larger power plants.
Marginal costs are positive, if lumpy.  An alternative perspec-
tive is that even with zero marginal cost, there is a need to
allocate electricity (or water) during peak times, and it is effi-
cient to do so according to willingness to pay.  The analysis is
remarkably similar to that applied above to Facebook adver-
91 The counterargument, as noted, supra note 90, is that users are providing
information about themselves without compensation and that there might be
more useful information if people were paid for its provision.  A subscription
model that gave a discounted rate, or zero rate, to those who agreed to have their
information mined and exploited, might be attractive.  Of course, that is a way of
describing the current regime in which participants are “paid” with social media
usage in return for providing information.  Note that some internet-based ser-
vices, like Hulu and various music sites, offer a menu, so that the customer can
pay for levels of an advertising-free experience.
92 See S. Gaudin, Effect of Price Information on Residential Water Demand, 38
APPLIED ECON. 383, 386 (2006).
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tisements.  The computer screen, or user attention span, can
be thought of as a lumpy marginal cost or, from a different
angle, nonuniform prices can be understood as a means of
allocating the available scarce resource among many interested
advertisers.
Where intellectual property is concerned, it is again the
case that marginal cost is often zero.  The creator of a song or
novel needs to be rewarded in order for society to encourage the
original production, but there is often no marginal cost associ-
ated with sharing the created work with new users.  This is
easiest to see when the novel or song is experienced online; the
marginal audience member imposes no cost on the creator, as
the work is already there to be enjoyed.  As with public utilities,
the government could subsidize the upfront costs of production
or—here it would be encouraging the creation of the work—
with prizes or fixed payments of some kind.  But most legal
systems have chosen to give the creator, or copyright holder, a
monopoly, so that an expected stream of royalties is the crea-
tor’s reward.  In some cases, this monopoly position generates
an obvious allocative inefficiency, but it is plausible that in
most cases competition from other works drives the royalty (or
retail price) down, though hardly all the way to the marginal
cost of production and distribution.  The inefficiency is thus
less than what would be experienced under a true monopoly.  If
iTunes charges $1 for a download, that is $1 more than margi-
nal cost, and there is deadweight loss because of potential
audience members who would enjoy the work only if it were
available at 25 cents, say.  On the other hand, $1 is much less
than what the most popular star of the day could charge, and
certainly less than what a music company would charge for
that artist’s work if it controlled all new music.
Copyright law has increasingly relied on—or been driven
by interest group pressure to—compulsory licenses, and the
argument in this section is that these licenses provide trans-
parency and reduce transaction costs in a manner that is re-
markably like our proposal.  We do not extend our proposal to
copyright,93 but rather suggest that copyright demonstrates
that something akin to our proposal is already flourishing,
though not exactly with respect to consumer transactions.
Consider, for example, the oldest and most straightforward
compulsory license in copyright.  Once a nondramatic musical
93 Most books, music, and films are, in any event, sold in transparent mar-
kets.  And where bargaining is found, it is rare for consumer transactions to be at
stake.
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work is distributed to the public, anyone can negotiate with the
copyright holder for a license to make another recording of the
work and to sell it to the public.  The negotiation would seem to
be in the shadow of the copyright holder’s right of reproduction,
adaptation, and distribution.  But for more than a hundred
years now, the latecomer who seeks to make a new recording,
or “cover” the song, can avoid negotiation and simply give no-
tice and pay a statutory royalty, determined (presently) by the
Copyright Royalty Board.94  The royalty is compulsory in the
sense that the copyright holder cannot hold out or refuse to
license the interested party, and it is “mechanical” in the sense
that there is no need for negotiation.  It is not, however, exclu-
sive; the copyright holder may perceive that the statutory rate
is too high, and that it would make more profit with a lower
price.  It is free to negotiate a lower rate.  It may do so in a way
that imitates or supplants the mechanical license by using an
intermediary, such as the Harry Fox Agency, which specializes
in these rights.95  The statutory rate is a ceiling under which
licensees might find a better (also mechanical) rate through the
Agency, and even that might be improved upon by negotiation.
By most accounts the impetus for the original statutory
scheme, in 1909, was the fear of monopoly power on the part of
music publishing companies.96  To be sure, copyright itself is a
monopoly grant, but the idea is that most of these “monopolies”
must compete with other music; if all popular music is con-
trolled by a very few owners, then “true” monopoly prices might
emerge, and many consumers would be excluded from the
market, despite the low marginal cost of production and distri-
bution.  Over time, the efficiency of the compulsory license has
had less to do with monopoly power and more to do with reduc-
ing transaction costs.  The user who wants to cover a song does
not need to negotiate, does not need to learn what others have
paid for similar rights, and does not need to worry that the
copyright owner will out-haggle and price discriminate.  In all
these ways, the compulsory license does for creative works just
what our proposal does for consumer transactions in various
94 See 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1) (2012) (providing that the Copyright Royalty
Board shall “make determinations and adjustments of reasonable terms and rates
of royalty payments”).
95 See What Does HFA Do?, HARRY FOX AGENCY, https://www.harryfox.com/
publishers/what_does_hfa_do.html [https://perma.cc/N6UK-HNZ8] (last visited
Feb. 18, 2018).
96 See Scott L. Bach, Note, Music Recording, Publishing, and Compulsory Li-
censes: Toward a Consistent Copyright Law, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 379, 389 n.60
(1986).
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markets.  We are not suggesting that prices, or even price ceil-
ings, be set in the manner of the compulsory license.  Our push
is for transparency or uniformity—though of course that is in
large part what the compulsory license does as well.  Put differ-
ently, the copyright statute97 could have required the copyright
owner of a musical work to file a price list, or state a single
royalty per record, that all subsequent copiers could pay in the
manner of early common carriers.  This too would limit trans-
action costs.  It is likely that the original statute did not follow
this path because it was as concerned with the monopoly
power of music companies as with transaction costs.98
The various compulsory licenses that have evolved in Cop-
yright impact many parties and rights, and they are easy to
criticize because they are building blocks of an awfully compli-
cated system.99  Moreover, some if not all these statutory li-
censes are plainly the product of interest group pressures.
Indeed, copyright law writ large can be understood as an ongo-
ing battle among interest groups, rather than a cohesive, well-
worked out statutory scheme.  The skirmishes are unattractive
not only because of the rent-seeking by interest groups, but
also because consumers, and perhaps some subsets of artists
and authors, are generally dispersed and disadvantaged in the
political arena.  Such laws should rarely be held up as exam-
ples of efficient lawmaking.  But here we do not point to the
prices or royalties set out in the statutory schemes as exem-
plars, but rather aim to show that the structure and very exis-
tence of these compulsory licenses comport with the notion of
saving transaction costs where marginal costs are low.  That
these compulsory licenses have survived through many itera-
tions of the copyright statute is a further clue as to their
desirability.
In short, there are markets where the social waste we have
associated with nonuniform pricing and even the negotiation
process itself is likely more than offset by the gains in allocative
and dynamic efficiency from allowing sellers to price discrimi-
nate.  The discussion in this Part has encouraged caution in
jumping to this conclusion for any particular market.  Trans-
97 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2012).
98 See Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protec-
tion of Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1925–26 (1990).
99 See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 62, at 110 (stating that “while Congress has
expanded the scope of rights protected by the Copyright Clause, as technologies
have changed, it has balanced the rights of access against these increases in
protection. These balances, however, are not, on balance” because “[m]ore content
is controlled by law today than ever in our past”).
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parent and even uniform pricing does not necessarily rule out
price discrimination.100
But how exactly should lawmakers discern when the ineffi-
ciency of duplicative search (and discouraged buyers) is great
enough to justify the uniformity-or-transparency requirement?
We have suggested that automobile dealerships, law school
admissions offices, rug merchants, and even hospitals and
Facebook (and other online sellers of advertising space) might
meet the requirements for a uniformity-or-transparency rule.
Each case supposes that any reduction in the ability to price
discriminate by these sellers will insufficiently impact effi-
ciency, so that any costs generated by transparency will be
offset by the benefits of eliminating duplicative search.  Alloca-
tive efficiency remains largely in place because marginal costs
are either increasing or flat; long-run efficiency remains unaf-
fected because the sellers in these examples can recover their
fixed-cost investments in new innovations.  In addition, to the
extent that transparency increases differentiation, it can pro-
mote innovation and enhance consumer satisfaction.101  Only
when price discrimination is essential, and differentiation not
feasible, should an exception be made, and nontransparent
negotiations allowed in these business-to-consumer sales.
CONCLUSION: PATHS TO TRANSPARENCY
The obvious way to gain transparency in consumer trans-
actions is through legislative action or administrative regula-
tion.  The Fair Packaging and Labeling Act (FPLA), enacted in
1967, already instructs the Federal Trade Commission and the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to issue regulations re-
quiring that all “consumer commodities” be labeled to disclose
net contents, identity of commodity, and name and place of
business of the product’s manufacturer, packer, or distributor.
The FPLA authorizes additional regulations where necessary to
prevent consumer deception (or to facilitate value comparisons)
with respect to descriptions of ingredients, slack fill of pack-
ages, use of “cents-off” or lower price labeling, or characteriza-
100 For example, airlines are able to price discriminate because they can make
airline tickets nontransferable.  This alone hardly means that such price discrimi-
nation is desirable.
101 See VISCUSI, ET AL., supra note 76, at 569 (noting differentiation as a source
of nonprice competition where firms invest in innovations to offer improved prod-
ucts). But cf. Richard Schmalensee, Entry Deterrence in the Ready-to-Eat Break-
fast Cereal Industry, 9 BELL J. ECON. 378, 378 (1978) (incumbents will offer new
brands to fill market niches in order to raise barriers to profitable entry).
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tion of package sizes.102  By its own terms, the purpose of the
FPLA is to facilitate value comparisons and to prevent decep-
tion.  Many products that are exempt from the FPLA neverthe-
less fall within the purview of the Weights and Measures laws
of individual states.103  Similarly, the FDA requires that labels
on foodstuffs list ingredients, and newer legislation requires
GMO information.104  A variety of other laws and regulations
require or control labels; tobacco warnings and information
about kosher products are but two examples.105
Presumably, these labeling requirements do not include
price information because merchants are permitted to change
prices over time, and also to negotiate with buyers at any given
time.  There are, as we have noted, various laws that require
prices to be posted, and even some that require unit pricing for
some goods.106  New legislation or administrative action is re-
quired for two reasons.  First, not all consumer goods and ser-
vices are covered in these disparate statutes.  For example, law
firm services are not household goods, and there are no state
and federal requirements regarding the publication of hourly or
other rates.  A law firm that affirmatively misled clients about
its prices could be subject to a fraud claim, and something
short of that might trigger a deceptive-practices claim, but for
the most part, the pricing of services is unregulated.
More important, even where there is a requirement that
prices be posted, consumers need not only current price infor-
mation, but also information about recent transactions.  That
is especially the case where prices are negotiable.  The neces-
sary change, or experiment, could come about as a matter of
state or federal action, on grounds that it reduces deceptive
102 See 15 U.S.C. 39 § 1454(c) (2012).
103 The Office of Weights and Measures of the National Institute of Standards
and Technology, U.S. Department of Commerce, is authorized to promote to the
greatest practicable extent uniformity in state and federal regulation of the label-
ing of consumer commodities. See NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., UNIFORM
LAWS AND REGULATIONS IN THE AREAS OF LEGAL METROLOGY AND ENGINE FUEL QUALITY
5–9 (2017).
104 See 7 U.S.C. § 1639b (2012) (establishing national bioengineered food dis-
closure standard); Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166,
178–79 (D.D.C. 2000) (upholding FDA position that bioengineered food was not
especially dangerous and in need of identification, though voluntary labeling
must be truthful).  See AS § 17.20.040; C.G.S.A. § 21a-92c; 22 M.R.S.A. § 2593;
and 9 V.S.A. § 3043; for state laws in Alaska, Connecticut, Maine, and Vermont,
respectively, that require GMO disclosure on labeling.
105 For cigarette labeling and advertising, see 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012).  For
kosher food and products, see, for example, NY Agriculture and Markets Law
§ 201-a (2014).
106 Supra note 54.
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practices, or it might be accomplished in wholesale fashion
through a new statute.  There is something to be said for exper-
imentation at the state or even local level.
An alternative path to transparency is the common law.
Much as courts have granted rescission and other remedies in
the event of nondisclosure of some material (and especially
unsafe) conditions, as noted in subpart II.G, they might do the
same when comparative price information is not forthcoming.
This seems unlikely because of the long history of haggling with
asymmetric information, but it is not impossible.107  Even a
very few successful lawsuits might lead legislatures to act—if
only to limit the reach of the common law—or might lead sellers
in a variety of industries to disclose current and past prices.
The same could be true for commercial buyers from consum-
ers, including purchasers of used textbooks, used vehicles, and
employers (purchasing labor from employees).  In these mar-
kets, the inexperienced party is the seller rather than the
buyer.
Finally, and most interesting, is the possibility that prac-
tices change without any formal lawmaking.  Consumers could
simply ask sellers for information about comparable transac-
tions.  Imagine, for example, that potential buyers at automo-
bile dealerships regularly asked for a list of prices in recently
completed transactions for the same model vehicle.  The seller
could decline, but if enough buyers began to take this disincli-
nation as a sign of a disadvantageous information asymmetry,
other dealers might begin to answer the question.  Conven-
tional fraud law prevents a dealer from responding with false
information.
Consumers might begin to ask for this information because
they are encouraged by consumer-oriented websites and per-
sonal algorithmic shopping assistants, or because some deal-
ers try to gain a competitive edge by supplying this information
freely as a means of competing with internet sales and rival
shopping technologies.  As voluntary openness takes hold in
one industry, it will increasingly spread to others inasmuch as
markets overlap.  In turn, as the evolution of face-to-face trans-
actions transpires, online sellers might develop a comparable
107 Consider that courts may apply mistake doctrine to void contracts where
one party is ignorant of information that merely serves to redistribute surplus
between bargaining parties. See Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Infor-
mation, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 9–11 (1978) (suggesting that
the court in Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178 (1817), voided a contract
because defendant’s superior knowledge of price was happenstance and not the
outcome of a socially productive search).
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and competitive disclosure style.  Once disclosure of this sort is
found in some industries, or on the part of many sellers in
several industries, it is easier for law to turn a practice into a
legal requirement, and also to expand the reach to all con-
sumer transactions.  Some sellers might pressure legislatures
to regulate in this manner in order to level their playing field.  It
is noteworthy that many familiar labeling requirements began
as voluntary or strategic practices on the part of some sell-
ers.108  We suggest that conventional sellers will be pressured
by the increasing digitization of sales, and the open and trans-
parent pricing which characterizes sophisticated algorithmic
shopping.
In some ways, this third, voluntary path is the most attrac-
tive, even if it takes time to evolve, inasmuch as it side-steps
the costs of implementing new policy.  The economic case for
change is based on the inefficiency of duplicative search, the
inefficiency brought about when buyers are disinclined to hag-
gle, and perhaps also the disparate impact of haggling.109
These reasons ought to be enough to cause some of us, as
consumers, to begin asking for information about completed
transactions and their prices.  When shopping in a showroom,
for instance, it is not so difficult to inquire, “At what prices did
you sell this item in the last thirty days?” much the same way
that algorithms can process vast price histories and suggest a
price to an online seller on behalf of a sophisticated buyer who
uses data-driven shopping applications.  Consumers who have
little haggling experience, and are aware that they do not recog-
nize the occasional negotiability of prices, may be especially
inclined to require disclosures.  This is especially so if they are
educated by Internet sites and digital shopping assistants to
beware that some merchants’ prices are set with haggling po-
tential in mind.
108 See, e.g., Gerald F. Masoudi, Kosher Food Regulation and the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 667, 671 (1993) (describing
how seller practices led to New York regulation of Kosher products).
109 Supra Part III.
